Abstract
In the summer of 1914, the Conservative Party was totally immersed with problems in Ireland. Each attempt to reach a deal between the Government and the Opposition over the Irish Home Rule question ended in deadlock. The obsession with Ireland in British politics, which had re-emerged after the two General Elections of 1910 had left the Liberal Government dependent on the votes of Irish Nationalist MPs to stay in power, ensured that problems of foreign policy had retreated into the background. This helps to explain why the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian terrorist, on 28 June 1914, did not instantaneously give rise to the prospect of British involvement in a European War.
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Notes
Z. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, London, Longman, 1977, p. 220.
D.C. Watt, ‘British Reactions to the Assassination at Sarejevo’, European Studies Review, vol. 1, 1971, p. 242.
J. Barnes and J. Nicholson, The Leo Amery Diaries 1896–1929, London, Hutchinson, 1980, p. 116.
M. Brock and E. Brock (eds), H.H. Asquith: Letters to Venetia Stanley, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 123.
Viscount Grey, Twenty Five Years 1892–1916, vol. 1, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1925, p. 337
W. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911–1914, London 1923, p. 216.
R. Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955, p. 220.
B. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, vol. 2, London, Hutchinson, 1936, pp. 82–86.
R. Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858–1923, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955, p. 221.
A. Chamberlain, Down the Years, London, Cassell, pp. 93–95. For details of the reaction of Conservative politicians in the period from 31 July to 4 August 1914, see Austen Chamberlain Papers, Birmingham University Library, 14/2/2.
I. Colvin, The Life of Lord Carson, vol. 3, London, 1932, pp. 16–19.
See also C. Adam, Life of Lord Lloyd, London, 1960, pp. 59–61, for Lloyd’s account.
K.M. Wilson, ‘The British Cabinet’s Decision for War’, British Journal of International Studies, vol. 1, 1975, pp. 151–157.
P.M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914, London, Allen and Unwin, 1980, p. 461. Only two Cabinet members — Morley and Burns disagreed with the policy of intervention.
H. Asquith, Memories and Reflections, 1852–1927, vol. 2, London, Hutchinson, 1928, p. 20.
C. Hazelhurst, Politicians at War, July 1914 to May 1915: A Prologue to the Triumph of Lloyd George, London, 1971, p. 42.
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© 2007 Frank McDonough
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McDonough, F. (2007). The Conservative Party and the Decision for War in 1914. In: The Conservative Party and Anglo-German Relations, 1905–1914. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230210912_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230210912_8
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