Abstract
Due to the geographical proximity and history, the Korean peninsula has traditionally been and continues to be one of the primary security interests for Japan. The Korean peninsula has been the strategic pivot in Northeast Asia and would directly affect the course of Japan’s own security. The memoirs of Munemitsu Mutsu (late ninteenth-century Meiji-era diplomat) Kenkenroku, a realist classic in understanding Japanese diplomacy toward Korea, depicted how Japan struggled in dealing with Korea during the Sino-Japanese War over the Korean peninsula in the transition to the modern era.1 As one Korea security expert and former military intelligence officer noted, the relationship between Japan and the Korean peninsula has traditionally been described as “shinshi-hosha” in Japanese, “lips and teeth, cheekbone and jawbone” in English, taken from an ancient Chinese phrase—which meant a relationship so mutually dependent that if one falls the other falls with it.2 Since the defeat of Japan in the Second World War and the end of the colonial period, Japan has allied with the United States to deal with security on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.
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Munemitsu Mutsu, Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–95, ed. and trans. Gordon Mark Berger (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1982). For a historical overview, see Takashi Inoguchi, “Korea in Japanese Visions of Regional Order,” in Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim, and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006).
Munemitsu Mutsu, Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–95, ed. and trans. Gordon Mark Berger (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1982). For a historical overview, see Takashi Inoguchi, “Korea in Japanese Visions of Regional Order,” in Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim, and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006).
Katsuichi Tsukamoto, Jieitai no Jouhousen: Rikubaku Daini buchou no kaisou [The Japan Self-Defense Force’s Intelligence War: Memoirs of Ground Force Staff Intelligence Bureau Chief] (Tokyo: Soshisha, 2008), p. 66.
On the dual security commitment of United States, see John Barry Kotch, “The United States Security Policy toward Korea, 1945–1953: The Origins and evolution of American Involvement and the Emergence of a National Security Commitment,” Ph.D. Dissertation (Columbia University, January 1976)
The UNC headquarters was established in July 1950 in Tokyo during the Korean War, but relocated to Seoul in 1957, and the UNC (Rear) was established in Camp Zama (U.S. Forces Japan base). Due to U.S. base realignment, the UNC (Rear) was relocated to Yokota Air Base (Command of the U.S. Forces in Japan) in November 2007 (MOFA press release). Yokota air base, Yokosuka naval base, Camp Zama, and Atsugi naval air station, Sasebo naval base, Kadena air base, Futenma Marine Corps air station, White Beach naval base on Okinawa are U.S. facilities designated as UNC bases. Charles M. Perry and Toshi Yoshihara, The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Preparing for Korean Reconciliation and Beyond (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2003), pp. 4, 7–8.
For historical analysis, see Hideya Kurata, “Nichibeikan Anpo Teikeino Kigen-’Kankoku joukou’ zensi no Kaishakuteki saikentou” [Origins of Japan-U.S.-ROK Linkage: Reinterpretation of pre-“Korea Clause” History], in Nikkan Rekishi Kyoudou kenkyuu Iinkai, ed., Nikkan Rekisi KyoudouKenkyuu Houkousho Dai3 bunka hen (Tokyo: Nikkan Bunka Kouryuu Kikin, 2005), pp. 201–231.
Sheila Smith, “The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” in Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp. 79–84.
Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “Nichibei doumei to Nikkan annzenhoshoukyouryoku,” in Hideki Ohata and Moon Chung-in, eds., Nikkan Kokusai Seijigaku no Shin Chihei-Anzenhoshou to Kokusai kyouryoku (Tokyo: Keio Gijukudaigaku Shuppankai, 2005), pp. 142–144.
The Soviet-North Korea Treaty of 1961 became ineffective and a new Russia-North Korea Treaty on Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation was signed in February 2000 in which the military assistance clause was deleted. The Sino-North Korea Friendship Treaty of 1961 continues, but there has been debate among China policy circles on whether China should delete the automatic military involvement clause in the Treaty. Jae Ho Chung, “Strategic Thought toward China,” in Gilbert Rozman In-taek Hyun, and Shin-wha Lee, eds., South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York: Palgrave, 2008), p. 178.
See Narushige Michishita, North Korea’s Military and Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966–2008 (New York: Routledge, 2009).
Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999)
Chong-sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985).
Jae-ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (Columbia University Press, 2006).
Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics and Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne-Rienner, 2009), Chapter 2.
Gilbert Rozman and Shin-wha Lee, “Unraveling the Japan-South Korea ‘Virtual Alliance’: Populism and Historical Revisionism in the Face of Conflicting Regional Strategies,” Asian Survey, 26, no. 5 (September/October 2006): 761–784.
Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999)
Noboru Yamaguchi, “Japanese Adjustments to the Security Alliance with the United States: Evolution of Policy on the Roles of the Self-Defense Force,” in Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2004), p. 80.
Hideaki Kaneda, Kazumasa Kobayashi, Hiroshi Tajima, and Hirofumi Tosaki, Nihon no Misairu Bouei [Japan’s Missile Defense] (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 2006), p. 89.
Masahiro Akiyama, Nichibeino Senryaku Taiwa ga Hajimatta [The Japan-US Strategic Dialogue] (Tokyo: Aki Shobou, 2002), p. 270; Yamaguchi, “Japanese Adjustments,” p. 81.
Hitoshi Tanaka, then MOFA Director of the Policy Coordinating Division of the Foreign Policy Bureau, voiced this frustration in his memoirs. After the nuclear crisis, MOFA became more proactive in the establishment of KEDO, and the sharing of financial contributions. Hitoshi Tanaka, Gaikou no Chikara [The Power of Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 2009), p. 66.
Ralph Cossa, ed., U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Building toward a “Virtual Alliance” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999)
When South Korea expressed concerns about the 1997 Guidelines, U.S. defense officials worked behind the scenes to promote defense cooperation between Japan and ROK. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, p. 91. According to former vice minister for defense Masahiro Akiyama, JDA consciously promoted transparency of the Guidelines review process with neighboring countries. In June 1997, Japanese defense officials visited ROK and China to explain the interim report of the Guidelines. The ROK officials showed a “very positive” attitude, and it was after this process that trilateral cooperation progressed. Akiyama, Nichibei Senryaku Taiwa ga Hajimatta, pp. 253–254. It is reported, however, that while ROK defense officials welcomed the briefing on the Guidelines, they were still wary of Japanese influence, and informally told JDA officials that ROK will not allow Self-Defense Forces to enter Korean waters or airspace, even for NEO. Asahi Shimbun, April 17, 2007, 5.
In February 1996, South Korea prepared to build a wharf and held military exercises in the vicinity of the disputed islands as countermeasures to Japan’s moves to declare EEZ in the area. Byung-chul Koh, Between Discord and Cooperation: Japan and the Two Koreas (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2007), pp. 343–350.
This was a search and rescue exercise (SAREX) between the JMSDF and the ROK Navy. It reflected Japanese and ROK concerns regarding North Korean vessels penetrating territorial waters, such as the submarine incident in 1996 and another vessel in 1998 in ROK waters, and a spy vessel in Japanese waters off the coast of Noto Peninsula in March 1999. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1999, p. 175. The exercise was featured in a column titled “Great Results in Japan-ROK Confidence Building—the first Maritime Joint Training” in the Defense of Japan 2000, p. 183. As a precursor, an ROK-Japan simulation game (naval exercise) was held in Masan and Chinhae by private organizations, the New Asia Research Institute (Korea team) and the Okazaki Institute (the (Japan team) in October 1998. Tae-hyo Kim, “A Simulation: Possibilities and Limits of ROK-Japanese Naval Cooperation,” in Sang-woo Rhee and Tae-hyo Kim, eds., Korea-Japan Security Relations: Prescriptive Studies (Seoul: New Asia Research Institute, 2000), pp. 239–257.
The Clinton administration not only asked Japan but also South Korea to join the theater-wide BMD plan called the Western Pacific Missile Defense Architecture Study (WESTPAC) in 1993. South Korea considered the option, but leaned toward developing its own missile defense in response to the North Korean SCUDs. After the Taepodong incident, the KDJ administration decided not to participate in BMD in March 1999, noting that the missile threat South Korea faced was limited to SCUD short-range missiles. Hideya Kurata, “Misairu Bouei to Kankoku” [Missile Defense and South Korea], Morimoto Satoshi, ed., Misairu Bouei (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 2002), pp. 132–138.
The Daily Yomiuri, September 22, 1998. On Japanese domestic processes, see Motofumi Suzuki, “Chousen Hantou Enerugi Kaihatsu Kikou (KEDO) Setsuritzu Kyoutei to Keisuiro Sien Kyoutei no Seiji Katei” [The Political Process of KEDO Establishment and LWR Funding Agreements], in Masaru Mabuchi and Toshiya Kitayama, eds., Seikai Saihenji no Seisaku Katei (Tokyo: Jigakusha Shuppan, 2008), pp. 28–35.
For the Japanese government report see “More on the Abduction Issue/Abductions of Japanese Citizens by North Korea,” August 2009, Headquarters for the Abductions Issue, Government of Japan, http://www.rachi.go.jp/en/ratimondai/syousai.html
For example, President Clinton placed the abductee issue on the agenda of Secretary Madeline Albright’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2000. On the Clinton years, see Larry Niksch, “North Korea and Terrorism: The Yokota Megumi Factor,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 14, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 7–23.
On the Six-Party Talks and nuclear diplomacy during 2002–3, see Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC:Brookings Institution, 2007).
On the domestic politics of “dialogue” versus “pressure,” see James Schoff, Political Fences and Bad Neighbors: North Korea Policy Making in Japan and Implications for the United States (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006), pp. 5–15.
U.S. State Department, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, April 29, 2004, p. 92.
Masashi Nishihara, “Have Closer Consultations with Japan, Please” AJISS (The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies) Commentary, no. 53 (January 9, 2009). Koizumi noted in a Diet session that the North Korean threat and the need to maintain the Japan-U.S. alliance as reasons for supporting the Bush administration on Iraq. Asahi Shimbun, March 20, 2003, p. 2
The concept of “cooperative self-reliant defense” was formulated in the first ROK National Security Strategy report in March 2004. It reflected the delicate balance between “alliance” and “self-reliance” supporters in the Roh era. See also Yasuyo Sakata, “The U.S.-ROK Alliance in Transition: The Post-Cold War Redefinition and Beyond, “Asian Cultural Studies (Tokyo: International Christian University), no. 13 (2004).
For discussion of “Northeast Asia balancer,” see Seong-ho Sheen, “Strategic Thought toward Asia in the Roh Moo-hyun Era,” pp. 110–113, Snyder, China and the Two Koreas, pp. 186–189, Takeshi Watanabe, “Chuugoku to Chousen hantou[China and the Korean Peninsula],” in Tomohide Murai, Junichi Abe, Ryo Asano, and Jun Yasuda, eds., Chuugoku wo Meguru Anzenhoshou (Tokyo: Mineruba Shobou, 2007), pp. 79–83.
Chang-hee Nam, Yasuyo Sakata, and Robert Dujarric, “Restructring U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia and Prospects for US-Japan-ROK Security Cooperation,” in Hyung-Kook Kim, Myongsob Kim, and Amitav Acharya, eds., Northeast Asia and the Two Koreas (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2008), pp. 124–126, 151–154.
James Schoff, Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Future of Extended Deterrence (Cambridge, MA: The Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis, March 2009), p. x.
After the North Korea’s nuclear test, conservative politicians advocated developing Japan’s own enemy base strike capability to supplement missile defense. This was deemed as unrealistic and the debate moved to developing combined strike capability in which Japan would directly support U.S. air strikes against enemy missile sites. Michael Auslin and Christopher Griffin, Securing Freedom: The U.S.-Japanese Alliance in a New Era, A Report of the American Enterprise Institute, December 2008, p. 28. On the “extended deterrence” debate, see Schoff, Realigning Priorities.
Michael Finnegan, Managing Unmet Expectations in the U.S.-Japan Alliance, The National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report #17, November 2009.
Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee Document, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” October 29, 2005.
Michael Auslin and Christopher Griffin, Securing Freedom: The U.S.-Japanese Alliance in a New Era, A Report of the American Enterprise Institute, December 2008, p. 14
Masashi Nishihara, “Nichibei no Kyoudou Taisho ga Tamesareta” [The Japan-U.S. Joint Response Was Tested], Sankei Shimbun, April 29, 2009, p. 7.
Yasuyo Sakata, “Kitachousen” [North Korea], in Masahiko Asada, ed., Heiki no Kakusan to Yushutsu Kanri: Seido to Jissen [Export Control: A Strategy for Preventing Weapons Proliferation] (Tokyo: Yushindo Kobundo, 2004), pp. 248, 250–251.
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© 2011 Takashi Inoguchi, G. John Ikenberry, and Yoichiro Sato
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Sakata, Y. (2011). Korea and the Japan-U.S. Alliance: A Japanese Perspective. In: Inoguchi, T., Ikenberry, G.J., Sato, Y. (eds) The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230120150_6
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