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Part of the book series: Studies of the Americas ((STAM))

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Abstract

For about a decade, from 1994 until 2004, the FTAA project mobilized human and financial resources throughout the Americas as countries prepared the ground for negotiations. Still, those efforts were insufficient to overcome the lack of political commitment by the cochairs of the negotiations, the United States and Brazil, to transform the project into reality.1

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© 2011 Zuleika Arashiro

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Arashiro, Z. (2011). The FTAA Negotiations. In: Negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Studies of the Americas. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230119055_3

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