Framing Analysis: Evaluating Presidential Statements

Abstract

The debate over appropriate ways to cope with terrorism varies in intensity as spectacular incidents explode and recede from popular memory, declared Rubin (1990, pp. xi–xii) in a prophetic remark befitting the situation the United States has faced since the Clinton administration took office in January 1993. Leaders must decide among a repertoire of policy responses taking into account both effective tactics and overall foreign policy interests. To compound the problem, measuring counterterrorism effectiveness is not easy— failure, though it may be rare, is starkly evident whenever violent attacks occur; rates of success, noted by the frequency of foiled terrorist plots, may be significant but unknown to the general public due to intelligence sensitivities. Logically, a trajectory of counterterrorism policies over time should lead to increased effectiveness as a product of decision makers’ learning curve and as better security mechanisms are implemented. A pattern of decreased effectiveness might emerge however, if a copycat process is expanding (more and more individuals and groups applying terrorist tactics in many, often vulnerable, environments in order to achieve their goals), and the sheer volume of attack attempts grows exponentially. In another scenario, when enhancing security factors (improved safety levels) intertwine with inhibiting security factors (terrorism diffusion) it may seem that changes in counterterrorism effectiveness are negligible.