Improving Transatlantic Alliance Burden-Sharing

Abstract

In 1954 Dwight D. Eisenhower responded to the suggestion that the United States should contribute troops to Vietnam even if France refused by noting that “[w]ithout allies and associates the leader is just an adventurer like Genghis Khan.”¹ Since World War II, America has often, but not always, gone to war with allies at its side. This book has sought to explain why some of the United States’ leading postwar allies—Britain, France, and Italy—sometimes provide and sometimes refuse military support for U.S.-led military operations. Chapter 1 established that all three states have a consistent, albeit not perfect, record of contribution. Chapter 2 provided two explanations of allies’ decisions—rooted in neoclassical realism and constructivism—and ten propositions specifying the conditions under which allies were more or less likely to contribute. Chapters 3 through 6 applied the explanations and propositions to seven U.S.-led military operations from Vietnam through the 2003 Iraq War. This chapter evaluates the extent to which the cases supported the propositions and the individual variables. It then discusses some of the general conclusions one can draw from the cases. The chapter closes by drawing on the book’s conclusions to offer advice to American policymakers seeking to improve transatlantic burden-sharing in the future.