Domestic Determinants of U.S. Policy toward North Korea and Ramifications for Pyongyang

Abstract

A well known political science axiom holds that “Only Nixon could go to China.” For those unfamiliar with domestic politics in the United States during that era, the notion was that in the furor that followed the “loss” of China to the communists, a relatively progressive Democrat such as President Kennedy or President Johnson would risk appearing weak were they to attempt to initiate relations with the People’s Republic of China. For the conservative and vocally anticommunist Richard Nixon, however, the political risk of his historic 1972 visit to Beijing was considerably lower. Put simply, despite the never achieved ideal of politics stopping at the nation’s borders, domestic political considerations do indeed have a significant influence on foreign policy considerations.

The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of The Asia Foundation Center for U.S.-Korea Policy Research Associate See-Won Byun.