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China: The Limits of “Unipolarity”

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Abstract

From its inception in September 1995 to the end of 2000, The Weekly Standard published over three times as many editorials on China as it did on Iraq.2 According to Robert Kagan, China posed the most serious longterm challenge to the unipolar global order and to Washington’s position as guarantor of peace in East Asia. Beijing had “the clear aim of using its growing military power to enhance its influence abroad,” he claimed, and its primary international purpose was to disperse the preponderant power of the United States.3 The Heritage Foundation expressed concern about “China’s drive to become a great military power” in Asia and viewed Beijing as “a looming threat,” while CSP designated it “the next great adversary” and claimed that its worrisome regional power projection indicated its “aspir[ation] to superpower status.”4 As far as Frank Gaffney was concerned, the U.S.-China relationship was going “frankly, toward conflict.” “In many ways,” he argued, “this is a time not dissimilar to … the 1930s.”5

Keywords

Most Favored Nation Heritage Foundation Clinton Administration American Power World Trade Organization Accession 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    William Kristol and Robert Kagan for the Editors, “Free Taiwan,” WSt., 26 July 1999: 11.Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    Robert Kagan, “Most Favoured Nation—Or Most Appeased?” WSt., 3 June 1996: 18, 20Google Scholar
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  4. 5.
    Gaffney quoted in “‘Blue Team’ Draws a Hard Line in Beijing,’” WP. 22 February 2000.Google Scholar
  5. 6.
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  6. 7.
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  11. 13.
    Robert Kagan, “Most Favored Nation—Or Most Appeased?” Editorial, WSt., 3 June 1996: 22.Google Scholar
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  14. William Kristol and Robert Kagan for the Editors, “Call Off the Engagement,” WSt., 24 May 1999: 9–10. For The Weekly Standard. increasing tendency to oppose engagement rather than propose an offensive posture, see “Clinton’s China Syndrome,” WSt., 27 April 1998: 7–8. “Clinton’s Sorry Excuse for a China Policy,” WSt., 22 March 1999: 9–10; “Peace through Strength,” WSt., 16 August 1999: 9–10.Google Scholar
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  18. 23.
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    CSP DB, “China Threatens Taiwan—And the United States: Will ‘A Missile A Day’ Keep the U.S. Away?” 26 January 1996, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p2115.xmlGoogle Scholar
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    William Kristol and Robert Kagan for the Editors, “Pressuring Taiwan, Appeasing Beijing,” WSt., 2 August 1999: 5–6; “Chinese Threaten to Attack Taiwan,” Independen., 20 July 1999; “U.S. Blocs Arms Sales after Taiwan’s Sabre-Rattling,” Independen., 22 July 1999.Google Scholar
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    Kristol and Kagan, “Free Taiwan,” WSt., 26 July 1999: 12Google Scholar
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    The B. C. Lee Lectures, “Asian Democracy and American Interests,” Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz to the Heritage Foundation (henceforth Wolfowitz, “Asian Democracy” lecture), 29 September 2000: 7,http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/12268_1.pdf.Google Scholar
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    Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomac. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts/ London, England, 2002): 91, 93–95; I. M. Destler, “Foreign Economic Policy Making under Bill Clinton,” in Scott (ed.), After the End. 89–107. David Tell for the Editors, “Selling Out to China,” WSt., 23 December 1996: 9; Robert Kagan and William Kristol for the Editors, “Clinton’s Sorry Excuse for a China Policy,” WSt., 22 March 1999: 10; Michael A. Ledeen, “No Tyrants Allowed,” WSt., 24 February 1997: 28–29; Michael A. Ledeen, “Springtime for Chi,” WSt., 16 December 1996: 12–13. See also attempts by Senator George Mitchell and Rep. Nancy Pelosi to introduce legislation linking MFN to human rights. Mann, About Face. 262–64, 278–81.Google Scholar
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  31. Michael A. Ledeen, “No Tyrants Allowed,” WSt., 24 February 1997: 28–29Google Scholar
  32. Michael A. Ledeen, “Springtime for Chi,” WSt., 16 December 1996: 12–13. See also attempts by Senator George Mitchell and Rep. Nancy Pelosi to introduce legislation linking MFN to human rights. Mann, About Face. 262–64, 278–81.Google Scholar
  33. David Tell for the Editors, “Selling Out to China,” WSt., 23 December 1996: 9Google Scholar
  34. Robert Kagan and William Kristol for the Editors, “Clinton’s Sorry Excuse for a China Policy,” WSt., 22 March 1999: 10Google Scholar
  35. Michael A. Ledeen, “No Tyrants Allowed,” WSt., 24 February 1997: 28–29Google Scholar
  36. Michael A. Ledeen, “Springtime for Chi,” WSt., 16 December 1996: 12–13. See also attempts by Senator George Mitchell and Rep. Nancy Pelosi to introduce legislation linking MFN to human rights. Mann, About Face. 262–64, 278–81.Google Scholar
  37. 33.
    Tell, “Selling Out to China,” WSt., 23 December 1996: 9.Google Scholar
  38. 34.
    Kagan and Kristol, “Clinton’s Sorry Excuse for a China Policy,” WSt., 22 March 1999: 10.Google Scholar
  39. 35.
    Kagan, “What China Knows That We Don’t,” WSt., 20 January 1997: 27.Google Scholar
  40. 36.
    David Tell for the Editors, “Kowtowing to Beijing,” WSt., 9 December 1996: 10 Google Scholar
  41. Robert Kagan, “The Price of ‘Engaging’ China,” NYT. 15 January 1999.Google Scholar
  42. Also, David Tell for the Editors, “‘We Have Not Made the Progress … I Had Hoped,’” WSt., 10 February 1997: 9–10Google Scholar
  43. David Tell for the Editors, “No Favors for China,” WSt., 21 April 1997: 9–11.Google Scholar
  44. Robert Kagan and William Kristol for the Editors, “Clinton’s Sorry Excuse for a China Policy,” WSt., 22 March 1999: 9–10.Google Scholar
  45. 38.
    PNAC Memo, 25 September 1997, http://www.newamericancentury.org/chinasep2597.htm; Mark Lagon, “Ties That Bind China,” WP, 8 April 1999, http://www.newamericancentury.org/china_pdf_03.pdf (30 December 2009).Google Scholar
  46. 39.
    CSP DB, ‘“Where Have All the Sanctions Gone?’ Additional Arguments for Blocking MFN to China,” 4 June 1990,http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p3615.xmlGoogle Scholar
  47. CSP DB, “The Ultimate ‘China Card’: Right Response to Odious Chinese Behavior is Recognition for Taiwan,” 26 May 1994, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p2862.xml (both 30 December 2009).Google Scholar
  48. 40.
    CSP DB, “Export Decontrollers Make the ‘Counter in U.S. CounterProliferation Stand for Counter-Productive,’”14 June 1994, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p2868.xml?genre_id=1Google Scholar
  49. CSP DB, “‘There You Go Again’: More Chinese Proliferation, More Clinton Politicization of Intelligence,” 12 June 1996, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p2092.xml U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China. Select Committee, United States House of Representatives (“The Cox Report”), undated, http://www.house.gov/coxreport/Google Scholar
  50. Johanna McGeary, “The Next Cold War?” Time. 7 June 1999: reproduced at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/ time/1999/05/31/china.htmlGoogle Scholar
  51. CSP DB, “Cox Report Underscores Abiding Nuclear Dangers, Should Caution against Efforts That Would Exacerbate Them,” 25 May 1999, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p1026.xmlGoogle Scholar
  52. CSP DB, “Chris Cox: Keeper of the Flame,” 31 October 1997, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p2270.xml (all 30 December 2009).Google Scholar
  53. 41.
    CSP DB, “An Alternative to Clinton’s Failed China Policy: ‘Strategic Containment and Tactical Trade Ambiguity,’” 19 March 1996,http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p2451.xmlGoogle Scholar
  54. CSP DB, “National Security Assessment: PN.T.R. for China Will Be Bad for America,” 18 May 2000, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p689.xmlGoogle Scholar
  55. Robert Kagan for the Editors, “Permanent Normal Appeasement,” WSt., 18 September 2000:Google Scholar
  56. 42.
    Ledeen, “No Tyrants Allowed,” WSt., 24 February 1997: 28–29; Ledeen, “Springtime for Chi,” WSt., 16 December 1996: 12–13.Google Scholar
  57. Ledeen, “Springtime for Chi,” WSt., 16 December 1996: 12–13.Google Scholar
  58. 45.
    Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 70, No. 1, Winter 1990/91: 24.Google Scholar
  59. 47.
    Robert Kagan for the Editors, “Permanent Normal Appeasement,” WSt., 18 September 2000: 11–12.Google Scholar
  60. 48.
    William Kristol and Robert Kagan for the Editors, “Pressuring Taiwan, Appeasing Beijing,” WSt., 2 August 1999: 5–6.Google Scholar

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© Maria Ryan 2010

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