Advertisement

Kosovo

Chapter
  • 123 Downloads

Abstract

Shortly after the end of NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999, Joshua Muravchik reflected that it had been a war that the United States “would not have felt the need to start had we faced up to earlier challenges.”2 The comment seemed to imply that Muravchik had favored regime change in Belgrade in 1993–95, but he had not and neither had any other neoconservatives. However, when all-out war developed in 1998 between Slobodan Milosevic’s forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)—an ethnic Albanian secessionist group in the Serbian province of Kosovo—most of the neoconservatives and their supporters called quickly for regime change in Belgrade. Milosevic, the perceived aggressor, had now been responsible for two regional wars, and the second, in Kosovo, was on the doorstep of NATO, the alliance having expanded into central Europe in 1998 to incorporate Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. As they were simultaneously doing in the case of Iraq, the neocons and their allies mounted a campaign for regime change in Serbia in order to protect the credibility and purpose of the NATO alliance and America’s leadership position within it.3

Keywords

Security Council Regime Change Republican Party Clinton Administration Democracy Promotion 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 2.
    Joshua Muravchik, “The Road to Kosovo,” Commentary. June 1999, Vol. 107, No. 6: 22.Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    Dana H. Allin, NATO’s Balkan Intervention. (Adelphi Paper, Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002): chapter 3;Google Scholar
  3. Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosov. (Colombia University Press, New York, 1998): apter 14Google Scholar
  4. Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosov. (Pluto Press, London, 1999): 24–37.Google Scholar
  5. 4.
    Hal Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad: America’s Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War Worl. (The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2008): 209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 5.
    Noam Chomsky A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the Standards of the Wes. (Verso, London and New York, 2000): 94–147.Google Scholar
  7. 6.
    Alan Little, “Moral Combat: NATO at War,” BBC 2 Special, 12 March 2000. Holbrooke quote in Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Reveng. (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000): 178. EU General Affairs Council, reported in Agence Europe. No. 7559, 9 December 1998: 4, in Peter Gowan, The Twisted Road to Kosov. (Oxford, Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, 1999). All cited in Chomsky, A New Generation. 105–06.Google Scholar
  8. 12.
    Kristol and Kagan, “Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility” in Robert Kagan and William Kristol (eds.), Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Polic. (Encounter Books, San Francisco 2000): 19–20.Google Scholar
  9. 20.
    Zbigniew Brzezinski, “NATO—Expand or Die?” NYT. 28 December 1994, Zbigniew Brzezinski, “NATO: The Dilemmas of Expansion,” The National Interest. No. 53, Fall 1998: 13–17; Karl K. Schonberg, Pursuing the National Interest: Moments of Transition in Twentieth-Century American Foreign Polic. (Praeger, Connecticut, 2003): 200–02.Google Scholar
  10. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “NATO: The Dilemmas of Expansion,” The National Interest. No. 53, Fall 1998: 13–17Google Scholar
  11. Karl K. Schonberg, Pursuing the National Interest: Moments of Transition in Twentieth-Century American Foreign Polic. (Praeger, Connecticut, 2003): 200–02.Google Scholar
  12. 22.
    Joshua Muravchik, “How Milosevic May Save NATO,” Wall Street Journal Europe. 23 April 1999. See also Muravchik, “Road to Kosovo”: 17–23.Google Scholar
  13. 23.
    Richard N. Perle, “Introduction,” in Perle (ed.), Reshaping Western Security: The United States Faces a United Europ. (AEI Press, Washington, DC, 1991): 2.Google Scholar
  14. Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe and the New World Orde. (Atlantic Books, London, 2003): 49.Google Scholar
  15. 25.
    Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From “Empire” By Invitation to Transatlantic Drif. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2003): 261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. 26.
    Kagan and Kristol, “Win It,” WSt., 19 April 1999: 10.Google Scholar
  17. 27.
    Statistics and citations taken from Kristol and Kagan, “Kosovo and the Republican Future,” and William Kristol and Robert Kagan for the Editors, “GOPEACENIKS,” WSt., 10 May 1999: 8.Google Scholar
  18. 29.
    Robert Kagan and William Kristol for the Editors, “Mr. Wobbly,” WSt., 31 May 1999: 9–10; Robert Kagan and William Kristol for the Editors, “Victory,” WSt., 14 June 1999: 11–12; Jeffrey Gedmin “Toasting NATO,” WSt., 19 April 1999: 16; Robert Kagan and William Kristol, for the Editors, “The National Interest,” WSt., 26 April 1999: 8.Google Scholar
  19. Robert Kagan and William Kristol for the Editors, “Victory,” WSt., 14 June 1999: 11–12Google Scholar
  20. Jeffrey Gedmin “Toasting NATO,” WSt., 19 April 1999: 16Google Scholar
  21. Robert Kagan and William Kristol, for the Editors, “The National Interest,” WSt., 26 April 1999: 8.Google Scholar
  22. 34.
    BAC steering committee listed on each action memoranda sent out by the group. Though these memos are no longer on the PILPG Web site, pdf copies of nine of the documents are available at the online library of South East Europe Onlin., http://www.southeasteurope.org/index. php?site=11 (21 December 2009); Susan Sontag, “Why Are We in Kosovo?” New York Times Magazine. 2 May 1999: 52–55.Google Scholar
  23. 37.
    CSP DB, “Glaspie Redux in the Balkans: As with Saddam, Appeasing— Rather Than Resistin.—Milosevic Is a Formula for Wider War,” 11 March 1998, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p1534.xmlGoogle Scholar
  24. CSP DB, “Wimpy Diplomacy.” CSP DB, “Clinton Legacy Watch #38: A Debacle in Kosovo, A Shattered NATO?” 22 February 1999, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p978.xmlGoogle Scholar
  25. CSP DB, “Is Kosovo Clinton’s Most Dangerous Wag-the-Dog Exercise?” 27 March 1999, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p999.xml (all 14 January 2010).Google Scholar
  26. 38.
    Zalmay Khalilzad, “Kosovo Needs Our Help,” WSJ. 24 September 1998Google Scholar
  27. Zalmay Khalilzad, “Kosovars Need More Than Bombs from the West,” WSJ. 25 March 1999.Google Scholar
  28. 42.
    Charles Krauthammer, “A World Imagined,” The New Republic. 15 March 1999: 22–25.Google Scholar
  29. 43.
    Charles Krauthammer, “The Clinton Doctrine,” Time. 5 April 1999: 88.Google Scholar
  30. See also Charles Krauthammer, “No to a Ground War,” Tim., 3 May 1999: 62.Google Scholar
  31. 44.
    Charles Krauthammer, “The Neoconservative Convergence,” Commentary. July-August 2005: 25; Krauthammer, “Democratic Realism,” Speech, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf.Google Scholar
  32. 45.
    CSP DB “What Are We Fighting For in Serbia?” 12 April 1999,http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p1002.xml (21 December 2009).Google Scholar
  33. 46.
    See “Mr. Wobbly,” editorial; Fred Barnes, “McCain’s Moment,” WSt., 19 April 1999: 11–12; John Kampfner, Blair’s War. (Free Press, London, 2004): 47–50.Google Scholar
  34. John Kampfner, Blair’s War. (Free Press, London, 2004): 47–50.Google Scholar
  35. 47.
    For examples of Clinton’s rhetoric, including references to the humanitarian catastrophe, see Robert C. DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Armed Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosov. (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 2002): 139–41.Google Scholar
  36. 48.
    Richard Holbrooke, To End a War: From Sarajevo to Dayto. (Modern Library, New York, 1998): 22, 43, 65, 103. Karin von Hippel, Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Worl. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000): 169–71.Google Scholar
  37. Karin von Hippel, Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Worl. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000): 169–71.Google Scholar
  38. 49.
    Madeleine K. Albright, “U.S. and NATO Policy towards the Crisis in Kosovo,” Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 20 April 1999, U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Vol. 10, No. 4, May 1999; Bill Clinton’s televised address of 24 March 1999. Both cited in Schonberg, Pursuing the National Interest. 195.Google Scholar
  39. 52.
    Ibid.: 143; Ivo H. Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosov. (Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2000): 69.Google Scholar
  40. 53.
    Chomsky, A New Generation. 123–27; John Pilger, “Revealed: The Amazing NATO Plan, Tabled at Rambouillet, to Occupy Yugoslavia,” New Statesma., 17 May 1999: 17Google Scholar
  41. 55.
    Tony Smith, A Pact with the Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promis. (Routledge, New York and London, 2007)Google Scholar
  42. Conor Foley, The Thin Blue Line: How Humanitarianism Went to Wa. (Verso, London and New York, 2008).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Maria Ryan 2010

Authors and Affiliations

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations