Abstract
While the case study in this book is Britain, this book is really about leadership and the role that leaders play in the formation of effective balances of power. This book was written with the expectation that the balance of power as a mechanism for preserving systemic stability and geopolitical independence has returned to prominence in recent years. Absent world government and in the anarchic order in which international politics plays out, the ability of great powers to forcibly deny the territorial and geopolitical ambitions of other great powers historically has been crucial in preventing any one state from exercising complete hegemony over the international system and controlling global resources for its exclusive use. In more recent times, arguments have been advanced that posit that the sharp edges of international politics can be blunted by channeling interactions through the agency of international institutions but, even according to theorists oriented to this approach, the ultimate guarantor of independence in the international system lies in the ability to deny the ambitions of others by force.1
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Notes
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York: Longman, 2001), chap. 1.
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 2006).
Robert A. Doughty, “The Maginot Line,” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 9, no. 2 (1997): 48–59, especially 51.
Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 201–2.
On the insistence of Sir Thomas Inskip, minister for the coordination of defence, to build fighters while the air ministry wanted bombers, see Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany: 1939–1945, Vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1961), 75–77.
Tami D. Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 121.
J.P. Harris, “British Armour and Rearmament in the 1930s,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no. 2 (June 1988): 220.
B.H. Liddel Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: G.B. Putnam’s & Sons, 1971), 117.
For more on Percy Hobart, see Trevor J. Constable, Hidden Heroes (London: Arthur Baker’s Ltd., 1971).
Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” The American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (September 1971): 682–93.
Alexander George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy, Paul Gordon Lauren, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1979), 58.
James D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing Political Science,” World Politics 43 (1991): 169.
Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).
Baldwin had wanted to bring Churchill into the cabinet but he was thwarted in that endeavor by his Tory colleagues. Baldwin, however, looked on the bright side, and wrote to a friend about Churchill saying, “If there is going to be a war—and no can say there is not—we must keep him fresh to be our War Prime Minister.” Quoted in Kenneth Young, Stanley Baldwin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), 112.
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© 2010 Ariel Ilan Roth
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Roth, A.I. (2010). Introduction. In: Leadership in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230113534_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230113534_1
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-29036-9
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