Conclusion

Abstract

While the fundamental decisions about nuclear antiaircraft arms were made during President Eisenhower’s term, his immediate successor agreed with the need for the weapons and accepted the ideas upon which they were predicated. Indeed, it was not until John F. Kennedy’s administration that atomic anti-bomber armament reached its peak deployment in the United States. Shortly afterward, however, the nation’s defense preparations underwent substantial change. After the advent of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, which were more difficult to counter and which could almost assuredly inflict enormous destruction, policy makers believed it was impractical and illogical to maintain extensive preparations to defend against an aircraft raid that might take place before or after an ICBM barrage. Partly for this reason, and also because atomic air-defense weapons were costly to retain, and because BOMARC never performed as intended, they began to be removed from service. Although a substantial number were dismantled by the end of the 1960s, others remained in the inventory longer.