Abstract
The spread of information across borders is now possible on an unprecedented scale. Thanks to satellites, the Internet, and 24-hour news coverage, we have more up-to-the-minute news about other states’ internal politics than ever before. This surfeit of information is increased by institutional transparency, defined as mechanisms that facilitate the release of information about policies, capabilities, and preferences to outside parties.
The authors would like to thank Andy Bennett, Nathan Brown, Paul D’Anieri, Jeffrey Hart, Jim Goldgeier, Joe Lepgold, Jeffrey Lord, Mark Lagon, James Ludes, Henry Nau, Steve Rock, George Shambaugh, and anonymous reviewers for International Studies Quarterly for their comments and assistance on earlier drafts of this chapter. This chapter is reprinted from Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord, “The Surprising Logic of Transparency,” International Studies Quarterly 43:2 (June 1999): 315–339.
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Notes
The authors would like to thank Andy Bennett, Nathan Brown, Paul D’Anieri, Jeffrey Hart, Jim Goldgeier, Joe Lepgold, Jeffrey Lord, Mark Lagon, James Ludes, Henry Nau, Steve Rock, George Shambaugh, and anonymous reviewers for International Studies Quarterly for their comments and assistance on earlier drafts of this chapter. This chapter is reprinted from Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord, “The Surprising Logic of Transparency,” International Studies Quarterly 43:2 (June 1999): 315–339.
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Maxime Rodinson supports this thesis. See M. Rodinson, Israel and the Arabs (London: Penguin, 1968). However, Ben-Gurion’s generally careful outlook and his hesitation during the 1967 crisis seem to undermine this argument (Brecher and Geist, 38.). Terence Prittie even quotes Ben-Gurion as suggesting Israel “sit out” the crisis for the next six months.
See T. Prittie, Eshkol: The Man and the Nation (New York: Pitman, 1969), 264. For his part, Dayan does not mention any such desire in his memoirs, which would be odd considering the great victory Israel won in the Six Day War.
See M. Dayan, Story of My Life (Jerusalem: Steimatzky, 1976), 243–249.
D. Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem (New York: Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1984), 138, 182; Lacqueur, The Road to War 1967, 141.
Dayan, 274–5. This is similar to the logic Thomas C. Schelling posits in his discussion about “the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.” T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 207–229.
Finel and Lord, “Democracy, Escalation, and the Security Dilemma: The Role of Transparency”; Lord and Finel; B. I. Finel, and K. M. Lord, “The Surprising Logic Of Transparency” (paper presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28–31, 1997).
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Finel, B.I., Lord, K.M. (2000). The Surprising Logic of Transparency. In: Finel, B.I., Lord, K.M. (eds) Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230107397_7
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