Russia: “The Indispensable Ally?”

Abstract

The most striking aspect of the Armenian foreign policy toward Russia after the end of the Soviet Union has been the disparity between the official language used to characterize it and the substantive normative changes that have occurred since independence. This chapter argues that by placing it in the realm of “natural,” the Armenian ruling elite disguises the necessity to address Yerevan’s current strategic dependence on Russia despite the erosion of its normative foundations and legitimacy. The discursive nature of Armenian-Russian relations in the context of the Armenian post-Soviet political identity is most evident in its embeddedness in hierarchical relations of power institutionalized by the Soviet system and in a sense that the “discourses ‘naturalize’ representations of self and other. They normalize identities.”⁴ One of the major hidden elements in this language of “normalcy” is the role of the Armenian ruling elite, which utilizes its relationship with Russia to assure its political longevity. This is conducted in various ways and with varying success. As the story of Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s presidency demonstrates, Russia’s withdrawal of political support may have been an important factor in his eventual fall, while Robert Kocharyan has used this relationship to consolidate his positions and to ensure the status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh stalemate.

I am speaking of mistakes that may have catastrophic, and if you will, tragic consequences ... I am speaking of a great misfortune, happening to us—the wild anti-Russian campaign started by certain circles. The fact in itself is outrageous, and moreover, politically fruidess since tiiere is nothing behind it but a savage desire to instill feelings that are uncharacteristic of Armenians, that are unnatural, and never experienced before—die feeling of animosity and antipathy towards Russians.¹

Our ties with Russia are something innate and natural for all Armenians, particularly those residing on die territory of die republic and die CIS. Its components are common cultural-spiritual values and traditional perception of Russia as die most significant regional ally and protector of Armenia’s security.²

Armenian defense doctrine would have to satisfy two essential requirements: 1) the capacity of Armenia to independently confront and win wars with Azerbaijan, and 2) a defense with at least one external player which would neutralize the Turkish threat. In the foreseeable future, only Russia is interested and willing to assume such a role.³