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Toward Annan’s “European” Solution

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Abstract

In a statement immediately following the April 2004 referenda, the UN Secretary-General encapsulated his 1999–2004 effort—the Annan initiative—by explaining that his goal had been to facilitate “a reunited Cyprus to join the European Union.”1 Such was the momentum in the Cyprus peace talks that Kofi Annan had declared at his 2003 New Year press conference that “we are within striking distance of reuniting Cyprus.”2 All previous attempts to bring about a political settlement to the Cyprus problem had been unsuccessful in shifting the entrenched positions of the respective parties. In structural terms, failure to link advances in the negotiations with concurrent movements in their external context had meant a disjointed pattern of progress. Yet, what distinguished this period from previous ones was that the UN-negotiated process was both driven and matched by momentous external developments.

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Notes

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© 2009 Michális Stavrou Michael

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Michael, M.S. (2009). Toward Annan’s “European” Solution. In: Resolving the Cyprus Conflict. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230103382_6

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