Abstract
My dependent variable is plutocracy, a type of governance structure that states sometimes use for economic integration. While two other structures—intergovernmental and supranational—are well known to scholars of integration, plutocracy—rule by the wealthy—has been overlooked. Under this third structure, members of the integration accord delegate policy making to the wealthiest state among them. My theory of plutocratic delegation, developed in this chapter, identifies five necessary conditions for plutocracy.
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© 2009 Kathleen J. Hancock
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Hancock, K.J. (2009). Theory of Plutocratic Delegation. In: Regional Integration. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230101913_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230101913_3
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