Regional Multilevel Governance in the Americas?
As previously mentioned, the 1990s have witnessed an amazing reactivation of regional integration in the Americas. In addition to the relaunching of older processes in Central America and in the Andes, and the initiation of new ones in North America (NAFTA) and the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR), the overall panoramabecame increasingly complex following the 1994 Summit of the Americas and the subsequent opening of hemispherical negotiations. At that time, conventional wisdom was that all the different existing integration processes would converge. A decade later, the project of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was stalemated, but the Summit of the Americas Process was alive, tentatively addressing a growing number of issues. In parallel, reacting to the frustration caused by the failed FTAA, the United States started to negotiate bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Venezuela, on its side, chose to oppose the FTAA, offering the Latin Americans a “Bolivarian Alternative” (ALBAN).
KeywordsCivil Society Regional Integration Regional Governance Issue Area Trade Facilitation
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Verónica Montecinos, “Ceremonial Regionalism, Institutions and Integration in the Americas,” Studies in Comparative International Development 31(2), Summer 1996.Google Scholar
- 3.Andreas Hasenclever; Peter Mayer; Volker Rittberger (eds.), Theories of International Regimes, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997.Google Scholar
- 10.Richard Feinberg, Summitry in the Americas. A Progress Peport, Washington, DC, Institute for International Economics, 1997, p. 103.Google Scholar
- 12.NAFTA covers exactly the same issue areas, except competition policy. For a view on the way the “Bush and Clinton administrations adopted strategies of targeted side payments in order to enhance the prospects for ratification of the agreement,” see William Avery and Richard Friman, “Who Got What and Why: Constructing North American Free Trade,” in Kenneth Thomas and Mary Ann Tétreault (eds.), Placing to Pegionalize. Democracy, Capitalism, and Pegional Political Economy, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1999, p. 111.Google Scholar
- 15.James Rosenau, “Governance in the Twenty-first Century,” Global Governance, 1, 1995, p. 13.Google Scholar
- 24.Nicola Phillips, “Moulding Economic Governance in the Americas: U.S. Power and the New Regional Political Economy,” in Michèle Rioux (ed.), Building the Americas, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2007, p. 25.Google Scholar
- 26.It could also be mentioned that after a decade, NAFTA did not provide a very encouraging model, as far as Mexican development is concerned. See, for instance, René Villarreal, TLCAN 10 Años Después. Experiencia de México y Lecciones para América Latina, Bogota, Editorial Norma, 2004Google Scholar
- Dorval Brunelle and Christian Deblock (eds.), L’ALENA. Le Libre-Echange en Défaut, Québec, Editions Fides, 2004.Google Scholar
- 43.Mónica Serrano rightly points out that despite several proposals made for instance by Venezuela (an Inter-American fund), the final declaration “comes out of a good governance manual: ‘each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development through sound policies, good governance, and the rule of law’ (Mónica Serrano, “Conclusion: The Americas and Regional Dis-integration,” in Louise Fawcett and Mónica Serrano [eds.], Regionalism and Governance in the Americas. Continental Drift, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 275).Google Scholar
- 58.Carlos Romero, Jugando con el Globo. La Politica Exterior de Hugo Chávez, Caracas, Ediciones B, 2006.Google Scholar