Abstract
There are four main ways to bring the executive branch to heel for abuse of power. Three of these methods are based in constitutionally authorized exercises of power, and the fourth arises from apostasy from within the executive branch. First, the Congress may inquire into executive branch activities through hearings, subpoenas, and studies by support agencies to Congress and other investigatory mechanisms. Congress may also threaten funding or cut off funding altogether in order to force executive acquiescence or strangle programs that have become questionable. Finally, Congress has the power to impeach and remove the president. The powers of Congress are extensive, but are rarely used with anyvigor and the maneuverability of the modern presidency almost always works to outflank the lethargic, deliberate, and cumbersome processes of the legislative branch.
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Notes
For most of the history of the United States, private bills were the chief means of recovery for citizens injured by tortuous actions of federal employees. The Federal Tort Claims Act was not enacted until 1946. See William G. Weaver and Thomas Longoria, “Bureaucracy That Kills: Sovereign Immunity, Federal Governmental Accountability, and the Discretionary Function Exception,” American Political Science Review 96, no. 2 (June 2002): 335–349.
See Theodore Lowi, The Personal President: Power Invested Promise Unfulfilled (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 97–133.
See, e.g., Steven G. Calbresi and Kevin Rhodes, “The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary,” Harvard Law Review 105 (1992): 1153
Steven G. Calabresi and Gary Lawson, “The Unitary Executive, Turisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Tustice Scalia,” Columbia Law Review 107 (2007): 1002
Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash, “The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,” Yale Law Journal 104 (1994): 541
Quoted in Harold C. Relyea, “National Security and Information,” Government Information Quarterly 4, no. 1 (1987): 11–28
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© 2009 Matthew J. Morgan
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Weaver, W.G., Flores, R. (2009). The Failure of Institutionalized Accountability in Matters of National Security since 9/11. In: Morgan, M.J. (eds) The Impact of 9/11 and the New Legal Landscape. The Day that Changed Everything?. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230100053_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230100053_13
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