Abstract
From the reasoning of the preceding chapters, one can deduce how an optimal policy mix would look with regard to monetary policy and wage increases. From Chapter 5, we know that in a world of endogenous inside money, nominal wage developments are central for the path of the equilibrium price level. Wage moderation by itself cannot change output or employment. For output to increase, aggregate demand has to be increased, which can be done by cutting interest rates.1 As wage bargainers thus cannot by themselves increase employment, while the central bank cannot by itself ensure price stability, some kind of cooperation is desirable if the target of both high employment and low and stable inflation is to be achieved.
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© 2004 Sebastian Dullien
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Dullien, S. (2004). The optimal policy mix and logic of a social pact. In: The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wage Bargaining in the European Monetary Union. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230006140_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230006140_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-52080-0
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-00614-0
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