Abstract
Collingwood writes clearly, persuasively and interestingly. He ignores technical terms and abstruse arguments in favour of expressing himself in ordinary if, on occasion, compelling language. His persuasiveness arises out of his evident determination to provide a self-contained and convincing series of arguments, which does not presume prior familiarity with his work on the part of readers. The interest of his writings reflects the range of his reflective concerns. Collingwood’s qualities as a writer are enhanced by an emotional honesty, which he presents as a feature of genuine artistic experience and which precludes him from relying on unreflected formulas. All of these features of Collingwood’s work mark him out as a singular philosopher. This singularity is emphasized by his rejection of the clubbability of academic life, his abhorrence at what would nowadays be canvassed as ‘networking’ and his insistence that the abstractions of theory are to be made to bear upon the practicalities of civilization.1
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Notes
R. G. Collingwood, Outlines of a Philosophy of Art (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1994), p. 3.
L. O. Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1969), p. 16.
See R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of History and other writings in philosophy of history, Edited and with an Introduction by W. H. Dray and W. J. van der Dussen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). This publication contains the material, which Collingwood completed of the projected The Principles of History and the two alternative Conclusions of the Lecture courses on Nature and Mind that Knox edited and published under the title The Idea of History with a different Conclusion.
T. M. Knox, ‘Editor’s Preface’, in R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).
L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics (Toronto and Buffalo, University of Toronto Press, 1970). See also, L. Rubinoff, ‘Collingwood and the Radical Conversion Hypothesis’, Dialogue 5/1, 1966.
N. Rotentstreich, ‘Metaphysics and Historicism’, in M. Krausz (ed.), Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 199.
See A. Donagan, The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
See the following chapters. T. Madood, ‘Collingwood and the Idea of Philosophy’, A. Oldfield, ‘Metaphysics and History in Collingwood’s Thought’ and R. Martin, ‘Collingwood’s Claim that Metaphysics is a Historical Discipline’ in D. Boucher, J. Connelly and T. Madood (eds), Philosophy, History and Civilization — Interdisciplinary Perspectives on R. G. Collingwood (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1995).
G. D’Oro, Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).
R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 56.
G. D’Oro, Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience, pp. 140–143. R. Martin, Historical Explanation: Re-enactment and Practical Inference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
P. Johnson, R. G. Collingwood: An Introduction (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1998), p. 30.
J. Connelly, Metaphysics, Method and Politics — The Political Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003), p. 74. I was able to read this book very shortly before completing my own. Its line of argument is largely compatible with and complementary to my own. It argues cogently for the continuity of Collingwood’s philosophizing, affirming Collingwood’s continuous commitment to the autonomy of philosophy. It supports this line of argument by a number of routes, including the fact that Collingwood himself did not advertise a break in his philosophizing and that his later books were planned to be published in a way which flagged their continuity. These lines of argument reinforce substantive arguments about the character of Collingwood’s early and late work, though, arguments deriving from what an author does not say about their work and about how his books were planned to be presented cannot in themselves be decisive.
R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Revised Edition, edited with an Introduction by R. Martin) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).
R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Philosophical Method (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1995), p. 192.
R. G. Collingwood, ‘Progress as Created by Historical Thinking’ in The Idea of History — Revised Edition ed. W. J. van der Dussen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 332. On occasions Collingwood balks at talking of progress, because he imagines the distinctness of historical situations as rendering the putative choice between scientific ideas meaningless. Nonetheless, he considers that thinking develops via reflection on previous thought. See R. G. Collingwood, ‘Function of Metaphysics in Civilization’, in R. G. Collngwood, An Essay on Metaphysics. It is also worth noting that Collingwood’s standpoint allows for the hermeneutic aspect of thought, whereby past and present are mutually determining so that a present standpoint emerges from the past but also reviews the past in the light of present interests and knowledge. Hence, Gadamer is wrong to criticize Collingwood for not being sensitive to the present perspective in which the past is examined. ‘With Collingwood we can say that we understand only when we understand the question to which something is the answer, but the intention of what is understood in this way does not remain foregrounded against our own intention.’
H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975), p. 374.
H. S. Harris, ‘Croce and Gentile in Collingwood’s New Leviathan’ in D. Boucher, J. Connelly and T. Madood (eds), Philosophy, History and Civilization — Interdisciplinary Perspectives on R. G. Collingwood (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1995), p. 128.
The two alternative Conclusions to The Idea of Nature have been published in R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of History and other writings in philosophy of history (ed. W. Dray and W. J. van der Dussen) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). The shorter one is referred to as ‘The Conclusion of 1935’ and the longer one, which is a first order work of cosmology is termed, ‘The Conclusion of 1934’.
R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945).
R. G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan (ed. D. Boucher) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
For a classic statement of Hegel’s views on theory and practice, see G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (trans. T. M. Knox) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 13;
G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel: Werke Theorie Werkausgabe (eds E. Moldenhauer and K. Michel) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), p. 27.
For a review of wide-ranging interpretations of Hegel’s political philosophy, see M. Riedel (ed.), Materialen zu Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974–5).
R. G. Collingwood and A. H. Hannay, ‘Preface’, to G. de Ruggeiro, Modern Philosophy (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1921), p. 6.
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Browning, G.K. (2004). Rethinking Collingwood: Dialectic in Theory and Practice. In: Rethinking R. G. Collingwood. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230005754_1
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