Fire across the sea: Japanese security and the Sino-Soviet strategic rift, 1960–64

Part of the St Antony’s Series book series


In the wake of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s cancelled visit to Tokyo, Ikeda Hayato’s first priority as Japan’s new premier was to reassure the stunned Americans of his government’s unshakeable commitment to their bilateral relationship.1 Yet as a Yoshida protégé, determined to avoid the mistakes of his predecessor, it should come as no surprise that from the very beginning Ikeda would take a close interest in the Sino-Soviet Alliance, and especially China.2 On 19 July 1960, in his first press conference as prime minister, Ikeda declared: ‘The most important thing for us is to increase our credibility in the Free World.’ However, at the same time he also wanted Japan to ‘become a country that will be taken seriously by the Chinese Communists, that will not be easily manipulated by them… We are watching China carefully and quietiy.’3 The Japanese public expected no less.4


Foreign Policy Nuclear Weapon Foreign Minister China Issue Threat Perception 
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Copyright information

© C. W. Braddick 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Musashi UniversityTokyoJapan

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