Verification by On-Site Inspection
For over half a century, on-site inspection (OSI) was presented by the US and its allies as the ultimate tool within a verification mechanism to monitor compliance with arms control agreements. It has formed the core of a system of mutually reinforcing elements of verification ranging from national means of detection to cooperative measures, including exchange and evaluation of information, ongoing technical monitoring and procurement control that were examined in the preceding chapters.
KeywordsSecurity Council Nuclear Weapon Verification System Chemical Weapon Additional Protocol
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