Controlling Supply: Procurement and Import/Export Monitoring
While remote monitoring, such as is envisaged by the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and the Expanded Safeguards Agreements, can determine with reasonable certainty whether a State is testing nuclear weapons or has moved material around internally, it cannot actually prevent or control the development and production of weapons, especially chemical and biological weapons.
KeywordsChemical Weapon Biological Weapon Export Control Chemical Weapon Convention Verification Mechanism
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