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Evolution of the WMD Control Regime

  • Berhanykun Andemicael
  • John Mathiason
Part of the Global Issues Series book series (GLOISS)

Abstract

A historical perspective is necessary for understanding the importance of verification as an indispensable element of any disarmament process, especially with respect to weapons of mass destruction. Verification is the process of gathering, analyzing and evaluating information to determine whether a State is complying with its obligations under a treaty or another type of agreement.1 The concept of verified disarmament is an integral part of the broader concept of arms control, which includes the regulation of armaments, the limitation of armed forces and the various measures to ensure transparency and build mutual confidence. Arms control was first defined in the 1960s as including ‘all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it’.2 A more concise recent definition broadens the concept to apply it to the century-old process by stressing security enhancement as a goal of all States: it presents arms control as ‘measures directly related to military forces, adopted by governments to contain the costs and harmful consequences of the continued existence of arms, within the overall objective of sustaining or enhancing their security’.3

Keywords

International Atomic Energy Agency Security Council Mass Destruction North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear Disarmament 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 2.
    Thomas C. Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, 2nd edn (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey, 1985), p. 2.Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    Patrick M. Morgan, ‘On Strategic Arms Control and International Security’, in Edward A. Kolodziej and Patrick M. Morgan (eds), Security and Arms Control, Vol.2: A Guide to International Policymaking (New York, Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1989), p. 301.Google Scholar
  3. 4.
    Hans Blix, ‘International Law Relating to Disarmament and Arms Control, with Special Focus on Verification’, in F. Kalshoven (ed.), The Centennial of the First International Peace Conference (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2000), pp. 44–5, 50–2.Google Scholar
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    Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 2nd and rev.edn (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949), pp. 165–8, 209–13.Google Scholar
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    A perceptive analysis is made in various articles in James Brown (ed.), Challenges in Arms Control for the 1990s (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992), especially by: Michael O. Wheeler on ‘Verification in the 21st Century: A Strategic Perspective’, pp. 3–14; Ronald F. Lehman II on ‘Issues and Challenges of Verification’, pp. 15–20; and Michael Moodie on ‘Multilateral Arms Control: Challenges and Opportunities’, pp. 71–80.Google Scholar
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    These phases largely correspond with the stages identified by Timothy J. Pounds in his article entitled ‘Proposals for On-Site Inspection over the Years: From the Baruch Plan to the Reagan Initiatives’, in L.A. Dunn (ed.) with A.E. Gordon, Arms Control Verification and the New Role of On-Site Inspection (Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1990), pp. 75–6.Google Scholar
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    Bernard M. Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), pp. 370–1; The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945–1970 pp. 12–13.Google Scholar
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    Leland M. Goodrich, The United Nations (New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell, 1959), p. 226.Google Scholar
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    Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan and Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Singapore: Simon & Schuster, 2000), pp. 299–300.Google Scholar
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    Blix ‘International Law Relating to Disarmament’, pp. 63–4, 67–9.Google Scholar
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    Timothy J. Pounds, ‘Proposals for On-Site Inspection’, pp. 88–9.Google Scholar
  12. 20.
    Michael Moodie, ‘Multilateral Arms Control’ in Brown (ed.), Challenges in Arms Control, pp. 71–4.Google Scholar
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    Rolf Ekeus, ‘Arms Control and the New Security Structures’, in Brown (ed.), Challenges in Anns Control, p. 24.Google Scholar
  14. 25.
    Nicholas Sims, ‘Verifying Biological Disarmament: Towards a Protocol and Organisation’, in Trevor Findlay (ed.), ibid., pp. 93–5.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Berhanykun Andemicael and John Mathiason 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Berhanykun Andemicael
    • 1
  • John Mathiason
    • 2
  1. 1.Energy Agency to the United NationsUSA
  2. 2.Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public AffairsSyracuse UniversityUSA

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