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Abstract

By examining instruments and prostheses through the lens of the famous rubber hand illusion experiment (RHI), this chapter comprehensively analyzes the sense of body-ownership (SBO) from a phenomenological perspective. Thereafter, via an examination of Blanke’s research concerning autoscopic phenomena, it discusses SBO on the level of the entire body. Seeking to better define (the lack of) SBO, this chapter also discusses the phenomenology of depersonalization and other related phenomena.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yochai Ataria
    • 1
  1. 1.Tel-Hai CollegeUpper GalileeIsrael

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