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The Twofold Structure of Human Beings

  • Yochai Ataria
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter discusses Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, particularly the twofold structure of human beings as subject and object simultaneously. When this basic structure collapses, we cease to be human beings. This chapter further focuses on the gap between body-schema and body-image, exploring the phenomenology of belonging and not-belonging to this world.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yochai Ataria
    • 1
  1. 1.Tel-Hai CollegeUpper GalileeIsrael

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