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Disquiet in the East: Relations with Russia and the Neighbours

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Abstract

Chapter 5 examines the oscillating trajectory of cooperation and competition that has characterised Poland and Germany’s approaches towards the EU’s eastern neighbourhood since the second half of the 2000s. Because of its proximity to the region that remains a key source of geopolitical instability, Warsaw has consistently viewed it as an area of first-order strategic priority and pursued policies aimed at its progressive integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. After it was thrust from its Cold War Frontstaat position into the community’s secure core—but also as a matter of a geo-economic imperative—Germany has in turn focused on cultivating a more complex partnership with Russia. These differences reflected Poland and Germany’s dissimilar geopolitical positions in the Euro-Atlantic community, and were additionally informed by their asymmetric economic power. However, the pair’s mutual tensions were also aggravated by their unequal capacities to shape the content of the EU external agenda as a function of dissimilar levels of their respective ‘ownership’ in the European project.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Fałkowski, Mateusz and Kai-Olaf Lang (2004a) “Wspólne zadanie. Polska, Niemcy i Ukraina w przeobrażającej się Europie,” Warszawa: ISP; Fałkowski, Mateusz and Kai-Olaf Lang (2004b) “Wspólne zadanie,” Rzeczpospolita, 30 October; Dębski, Sławomir (2006) “Polska-Niemcy. Razem na Wschód,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 8 June; Dębski, Sławomir (2004) “Polsko-niemiecki tandem w sprawie polityki UE wobec państw Europy Wschodniej,” Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny 4:6 (22), pp. 5–15; Hübner, Danuta (2007) “Speech on Eastern Policy of the European Union,” Berlin, 30 March.

  2. 2.

    Kosowska, Adrianna (2007) “European Neighbourhood Policy Plus—the Polish point of view.” Paper presented at the 6th CEEISA Convention on Global and Regional GovernanceEuropean Perspectives and Beyond, 24–26 May, Wrocław.

  3. 3.

    Eastern policy featured as one of Poland’s top three areas of special interests in all foreign ministers’ exposés to the Sejm during the 1990s, but also in the country’s 1992 defense strategy, for instance. See President of the Republic of Poland (1992) “Założenia polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa,” and “Polityka bezpieczeństwa i strategia obronna Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej,” Komitet Obrony Kraju, Warsaw, 2 November.

  4. 4.

    Snyder, Timothy (2003) The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999. New Haven: YUP.

  5. 5.

    Geremek, Bronisław (1998b) “Wystąpienie Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej Bronisława Geremka na otwarcie negocjacji Polski o członkostwo w Unii Europejskiej,” Brussels, 31 March, Warsaw: MSZ.

  6. 6.

    Sikorski, Radek (2008) “Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o założeniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2008 roku,” 6th Sejm, 15th session, Warsaw, 7 May.

  7. 7.

    Marek Karp cited in Buras, Piotr and Karolina Pomorska (2006) “Poland and the European Neighbourhood Policy,” in Marco Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnisch, (eds) New Neighbourhood Policy of the EU, Foreign Policy in Dialogue 7:1, University of Trier, p. 35.

  8. 8.

    Marek Siwiec cited in Buras and Pomorska (2006) p. 35.

  9. 9.

    Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz (2003a) “The Eastern Dimension of the European Union. The Polish View.” Speech at the Conference on The EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Warsaw, 20 February.

  10. 10.

    European Council (2002) “New Neighbours Initiative—Council Conclusions,” 14078/2002, Brussels, 18 November.

  11. 11.

    European Commission (2003) “Wider Europe—Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours.” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March.

  12. 12.

    The document included Russia, but Moscow declined to participate.

  13. 13.

    See Prodi, Romano (2002) “A Wider Europe—A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability.” Speech delivered at the 6th ECSA World Conference, Brussels, 5–6 December.

  14. 14.

    See Federal Foreign Office/Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland (2003) “Die Rolle der EU mit 25 und mehr Mitgliedern im 21. Jahrhundert. Beiträge für eine neue Weltordnung. Gemeinsame deutsch-polnische Studien,” June 2001–May 2003, Berlin/Warsaw.

  15. 15.

    Verheugen, Günter (2003) “EU Enlargement and the Union’s Neighbourhood Policy.” Speech delivered at the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow, 27 October.

  16. 16.

    Fürst (2008).

  17. 17.

    Rotfeld, Adam (2005) “Informacja rządu o polityce zagranicznej. Exposé Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych w Sejmie,” Warsaw, 21 January.

  18. 18.

    Der Spiegel (2005) “Eine bittere Lektion—Außenminister Adam Rotfeld über das Engagement seines Landes in der Ukraine, die EU-Politik gegenüber Osteuropa und das Verhältnis zu den USA,” 28 February.

  19. 19.

    FAZ (2006b) “Berlin entwickelt neue Nachbarschaftspolitik,” 3 July. See also FAZ (2006c) “Berlin schlägt in der EU-Russlandpolitik ‘Annährung durch Verflechtung,’” 4 September.

  20. 20.

    Barysch Katinka (2007) What to Expect from the German Presidency. London: CER, January 2007.

  21. 21.

    See European Commission (2006) “Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy,” COM(2006)726 final, Brussels, 4 December.

  22. 22.

    See European Commission (2007) “A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy,” COM(2007)774 final, Brussels, 5 December.

  23. 23.

    Cianciara, Agnieszka (2008) “Does the Strengthened European Neighbourhood Policy Restore the Balance Between Southern and Eastern Partner Countries?” Analyses and Opinions 2, Warsaw: ISP, March.

  24. 24.

    See The Economist (2009) “Whose backyard? Russia and the West fume and fudge over the countries in between,” 8 May. See also Schäffer, Sebastian and Dominik Tolksdorf (2009) “The Eastern Partnership— ‘ENP plus’ for Europe’s Eastern neighbors,” C.A.Perspectives 4, Munich.

  25. 25.

    Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich (2008a) “Pierwsze reakcje na inicjatywe Wschodniego Partnerstwa”, Tydzień na Wschodzie, Warsaw, 28 May; Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich (2009) “Reakcje na szczyt inauguracyjny Partnerstwa Wschodniego”, Tydzień na Wschodzie, Warsaw, 13 May; Lobjakas, Ahto (2008) “Bruksela próbuje studzić ambicje do ‘Wschodniego Partnerstwa,’ RFE/RL, 11 November; TVN24 Online (2009) “Juszczenko krytykuje Partnerstwo Wschodnie,” 30 July, http://www.tvn24.pl/12691,1612346,1,6,juszczenko-krytykuje-partnerstwo-wschodnie,wiadomosc.html.

  26. 26.

    Gazeta Wyborcza (2009) “Kaczyński o polityce zagranicznej: Wielka, wielka porażka,” 21 March. During the launch of the EaP, Foreign Minister Sikorski argued that ‘in Poland, we distinguish between the EU’s southern and eastern neighbours. In the south, we have neighbours of Europe. In the east, we have European neighbours of the EU that—if they fulfil the criteria—will one day be able to apply for membership.’ The German government took a different view. For instance, during her visit to Kyiv in mid-2008, Chancellor Angela Merkel described the EaP as ‘an agreement to deepen relations considerably—trade, economic relations and legal structures. This is not to be confused with the possibility of entering the European Union.’ See Goldirova, Renata (2008a) “‘Eastern Partnership’ could lead to enlargement, Poland says,” EUObserver, 27 May; and Ward, Josh (2008) “Mindful of Moscow, Merkel applies brakes in Kiev,” Der Spiegel, 22 July.

  27. 27.

    Goldirova (2008a).

  28. 28.

    Warsaw Voice (2008) “Poland Pushes for New ‘Eastern Partnership,” 11 June.

  29. 29.

    Der Tagesspiegel (2008) “Schwedenhappen,” 27 May.

  30. 30.

    Ochmann, Cornelius (2009) “EU Eastern Partnership: Fine, but what about Russia?” Spotlight Europe 6, Bertelsmann, May; Lobjakas (2008).

  31. 31.

    Leonard, Mark and Nicu Popescu (2007) A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations, London: ECFR, p. 48.

  32. 32.

    Sikorski, Radek (2011) “Annual Address: The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy for 2011,” Warsaw: MSZ, 16 March.

  33. 33.

    Meller, Stefan (2006) “Informacja Rządu na temat Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej w 2006 r,” 5th Sejm, 10th session, Warsaw, 15 February.

  34. 34.

    See Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland (2003) “Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Reczpospolitej Polskiej,” Rada Ministrów Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, Warsaw, 22 July. See also Rzeczpospolita (2011) “Przede wszystkim partnerstwo,” 3 February; Osińska, Lucyna (2007) “Polskie a ukraińskie pojmowanie partnerstwa strategicznego pomiędzy Warszawą a Kijowem,” Dialogi Polityczne 8, p. 25; Bałon, Krzysztof (2001) “Co to jest partnerstwo strategiczne?” Biuletyn 34, PISM, p. 414; Burant, Stephen (2000) “Stosunki polsko–ukraińskie a idea strategicznego partnerstwa,” Warszawa: FWW, pp. 9–10.

  35. 35.

    Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz (2004) “Polska w zamęcie świata,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 12–13 June.

  36. 36.

    Silberberg, Reinhard (2006) “A Preview of Germany’s EU Presidency: The Status of the Federal Government’s Preparations.” Speech by State Secretary, Berlin, 4 October.

  37. 37.

    Stelzenmüller, Constanze (2009) “Germany’s Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe,” Foreign Affairs 88, pp. 89–100; Chivvis, Christopher S. and Thomas Rid (2009) “The Roots of Germany’s Russia Policy,” Survival 51: 2, pp 105–122.

  38. 38.

    See Zaborowski (2004a); Buras and Pomorska (2006); Malinowski (2006); Frank (2008b); Ziemer (2009); Osica, Olaf (2002a) “Polska wobec wspólniej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa UE,” in Marek Cichocki (ed.) PolskaUnia Europejska: W pól drogi. Wybrane problemy, Warsaw: CSM, pp. 67–88; Longhurst, Kerry and Marcin Zaborowski (2003) “America’s protégé in the east? The emergence of Poland as a regional leader,” in International Affairs 79:5, pp.1009–1028; Lang, Kai-Olaf (2005b) “Polen und der Osten,” SWP-Aktuell 22, Berlin: SWP; Pomorska, Karolina (2007) The Impact of Enlargement: Europeanisation of Polish Foreign Policy? Tracking adaptation and change in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 2:1; Macków, Jerzy (1998) Die Konstruktion politischer Stabilität. Polen und Russland in den Umbrüchen der achtziger und neunziger Jahre. Baden-Baden: Nomos; Macków, Jerzy (2003) “Russlands Beziehungen zu seinen ‘slawischen Brüdern’ Ukraine und Belarus,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 16–17, pp. 31–38. For counterview see Dębski, Sławomir (2005) “The Polish-German Tandem in the EU’s Policy Towards Eastern European Countries,” The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest 5:1 pp. 7–17.

  39. 39.

    Frank (2008a); Frank, Cornelia (2005) “Polnische Sicherheitspolitik in der Transformation,” DIAS Analyse 18, Dusseldorf: DIAS; Ziemer (2009) p. 51.

  40. 40.

    Ochamann, Cornelius (2007) “Polish-Russian Relations in the Context of the EU’s New Eastern Policy,” Working Paper 8. Koszalin: KICES.

  41. 41.

    Lang, Kai-Olaf (2005a) “Poland and the East: Poland’s Relations with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine in the Context of European Eastern Policy,” SWP Comments C23, June, Berlin: SWP; Ziemer (2009) p. 11; Frank (2008b); Garnett, Sherman W (1996) “Poland: Bulwark or Bridge?” Foreign Policy 102, Spring, pp. 66–82.

  42. 42.

    For example, see Valasek, Tomas (2011) “Central Europe and NATO’s Nuclear Deterrent”, in If the Bombs Go: European Perspectives on NATO’s Nuclear Debates, Whitehall Report 1:11 (May).

  43. 43.

    Wilga, Beata (2006) “Aus Warschauer Perspektive,” WeltTrends: Zeitschrift für internationale Politik 52 (Deutsche Ostpolitik) pp. 58–62.

  44. 44.

    Mortsiefer, Henrik (2007) “Russland lockt deutsche Mittelständler,” Der Tagesspiegel, 13 May; Büttner, Christine (2008) “Deutscher Mittelstand profitiert von Russlands wirtschaftsdynamik,” Dow Jones News, Frankfurt, 14 January.

  45. 45.

    Walt (1985).

  46. 46.

    See Umbach, Frank (2008) “Deutschland, Polen und die gemeinsame EU-Energiepolitik. Chancen der Kooperation in puncto Versorgungssicherheit,” in Jäger and Dylla (2008a) pp. 261–288.

  47. 47.

    Russia’s defence budget increased nearly six-fold between 2000 and 2010, (when it surpassed the USD 40 billion mark). In 2010 Russia launched a USD 700 billion programme to modernize its armed forces. See Weir, Fred (2011) “With Russia’s $650 billion rearmament plan, the bear sharpens its teeth,” Christian Science Monitor, 28 February.

  48. 48.

    Sikorski, Radek (2010) Interview on CNN’s Fareed Zakaria: Global Public Square, 18 April.

  49. 49.

    See The Economist (2009) “War games—Jitters in eastern Europe over Russia’s military manoeuvres,” 29 October.

  50. 50.

    Cienski, Jan and Stefan Wagstyl (2006) “Poland proposes an EU army tied to Nato,” Financial Times, 5 November. In an interview given in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s incursion into Georgia in 2008, President Kaczyński insisted that he is ‘rational, not anti-Russian. We have to convince Russia that the imperial age is over. The situation is a little like Munich in 1938.’ See Nagorski, Andrew (2008) “Interview with Polish President Lech Kaczyński: How the West got Georgia wrong,” Newsweek, 27 September.

  51. 51.

    See Der Spiegel (2007) “Gebührenstreit: Russland entzieht Lufthansa Cargo Überflugerlaubnis,” 30 October.

  52. 52.

    Lang, Kai-Olaf (2008) “Polen, Deutschland und die EU-Ostpolitik: Spannungsfelder und Kooperationspotential,” in Jäger and Dylla (2008a) pp. 123–136, p. 131.

  53. 53.

    See interjections by Polish MEPs in a debate on the domestic political developments in Ukraine: European Parliament (2004) “Ukraine: MEPs call for repeat of second round election,” Council and Commission statements on the situation in Ukraine, 12 January, Dok: B6-0195/2004.

  54. 54.

    See Karatnycky, Adrian (2005) “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, March/April, pp. 35–53.

  55. 55.

    For Interssenwanderung or Interessenverlagerung, see Marchetti, Andreas (2008) “Eine neuerliche Erweiterungsrunde?” in Jäger and Dylla (2008a) pp. 137–159, p. 154; Piehl, Ernst, Peter W. Schulze and Heinz Timmermann (2005) Die offene Flanke der Europäischen Union. Berlin: BWV, p. 440.

  56. 56.

    Poland had a higher surplus only with the UK.

  57. 57.

    Trade data from Central Statistical Office (Główny Urząd Statystyczny) www.stat.gov.pl.

  58. 58.

    The Polish-Ukrainian bid was made in 2007, shortly after Gazprom announced its sponsorship of FC Schalke 04.

  59. 59.

    See Gazeta Wyborcza (2007) “Sondaż: Polacy najbardziej lubią Irlandczyków, a najmniej—Arabów,” 17 September.

  60. 60.

    Marchetti (2008) p. 147.

  61. 61.

    FAZ (2005) “Fischer kündigt ‘klare Worte,’” 24 February.

  62. 62.

    Berlin has since become one of the key demandeurs of European level solutions in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), spearheading efforts to keep the EU’s external borders impenetrable to illicit goods and migrants in light of the imminent enlargement of the Schengen area. See Bulmer and Paterson (2010) p. 1052.

  63. 63.

    The three 1995 entrants were connected to the European project much earlier as members of EFTA.

  64. 64.

    With the notable exception of Sweden, which was the only net contributor to the EU budget where enlargement enjoyed the support of a slim majority (of 53%). See Marchetti (2008) p. 140.

  65. 65.

    At 69%, the Poles scored 23 percentage points above average in terms of their support for further EU enlargements. See Eurobarometer (2009a) p. 11.

  66. 66.

    Eurobarometer (2009b) “National Report Executive Summary: Germany,” Standard Eurobarometer 71, Spring, Brussels: European Commission, p. 4.

  67. 67.

    Bürgin, Alexander (2004) “Umfrage der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung: Deutsche lehnen EU-Osterweiterung ab”, Der Spiegel, 27 February.

  68. 68.

    Wolfgang Schäuble and Claudia Nolte stand out as two notable CDU politicians who publicly supported the idea of Ukraine’s membership in the EU. See Spiegel Online (2004) “CDU möchte Ukraine als EU-Partner,” 28 December.

  69. 69.

    In conversation with the author in Cortona on 7 July 2008.

  70. 70.

    Following the Orange Revolution, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) assessed most Ukrainian elections (with the exception of the 2012 parliamentary vote) as having met most international standards for democratic elections.

  71. 71.

    See Komorowski, Bronisław (2009) “Pamiętajmy o Ukrainie i Białorusi, razem tworzylismy II Rzeczpospolitą,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 September.

  72. 72.

    Mieroszewski and Giedroyc’s original prescription saw Russia as a part of Europe, albeit as an equal partner, not a first among equals. See Giedroyc, Jerzy and Juliusz Mieroszewski (1999) Listy 19491956 (Part 1 & 2). Warsaw: Czytelnik.

  73. 73.

    Speaking on ARD TV’s “Beckmann-Show” in late 2004, for instance, Chancellor Schröder described the Russian President as a ‘flawless democrat.’ ‘He wants to and will turn Russia into a proper democracy,’ the Chancellor said. See Hamburger Abendblatt (2004) “Schröder: “Putin ist lupenreiner Demokrat,” 23 November.

  74. 74.

    See Stelzenmüller (2009) or Chivvis and Rid (2009) for a counterview.

  75. 75.

    See Stelzenmüller (2009); Dempsey, Judy (2008) “Business remains robust between Germany and Russia,” International Herald Tribune, 21 October.

  76. 76.

    Götz, Roland (2006) “Deutschland und Russland—’strategische Partner’?” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 11, 13 March, pp. 14–23; Franzke, Jochen (2006) “Berlin und der neue Osten. Denkanstöße einer neuen ostpolitischen Diskussion,” WeltTrends 52, pp. 78–89; Franzke, Jochen (2009) “Wertepolitik versus Realpolitik. Die Russlandpolitik der Regierung Merkel/Steinmeier?” Welttrends 67, pp. 91–99; Rheinische Post (2010) “Russlandbesuch mit Westerwelle: Merkel strebt engere Partnerschaft mit Russland an,” 14 July; Grabowsky, Fabian (2009) “Kontinuität der Konkurrenten,” tagesschau.de, 18 August.

  77. 77.

    By some accounts, Berlin has become more complacent vis-à-vis Moscow during the second half of the 2000s. Earlier in the decade, the SPD-controlled Chancellery’s pro-Russia attitude was offset by a more critical Foreign Office under Minister Fischer. By way of contrast, during the ‘grand coalition’ government in the second half of the 2000s, the CDU remained largely attuned to business interests in Russia, while the SPD-administered Foreign Office served as a hub of pro-Russia lobbying. See Dempsey, Judy (2008) “Business remains robust between Germany and Russia,” IHT, 21 October.

  78. 78.

    See FAZ (2006c) “Berlin schlägt in der EU-Russlandpolitik ‘Annäherung durch Verflechtung’ vor.” 4 September, p. 5.

  79. 79.

    Mahony, Honor (2006) “Germany wants to bind Russia to EU,” EUObserver, 1 September.

  80. 80.

    For a critique of the ‘second’ Ostpolitik, see Garton Ash, Timothy (1993) In Europe’s Name. Germany and the Divided Continent. New York: Random House; See also Suri, Jeremi (2003) Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente. Cambridge: HUP; Cary, Noel (2000) “Review: Reassessing Germany’s Ostpolitik (Parts 1 & 2)” Central European History, CUP, 33:2 and 33:3.

  81. 81.

    The paper mentioned ‘new links to support change in Russia’, but it failed to explain what ‘change’ means in this context.

  82. 82.

    For an analysis of the debate Die neu Ostpolitik with Egon Bahr and Planning Staff Director Markus Ederer at the International Club in Berlin in June 2007, see Hahn, Frank (2007) “Neue Ostpolitik: vom Wandel durch Annäherung zur Integration und Verflechtung,” salon-line.de, 15 June.

  83. 83.

    Ibid.

  84. 84.

    See Umbach (2008).

  85. 85.

    See Shevtsova, Lilia (2007) RussiaLost in Transition:The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies. Moscow: Carnegie Endowment.

  86. 86.

    Lucas, Edward (2009) The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

  87. 87.

    Wilson, Andrew and Nicu Popescu (2009) “Russian and European neighbourhood policies compared,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 9:3, September, pp. 317–331.

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Szwed, S. (2019). Disquiet in the East: Relations with Russia and the Neighbours. In: Poland, Germany and State Power in Post-Cold War Europe. St Antony's Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95352-3_5

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