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Disability and Doing Justice

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Part of the book series: Jepson Studies in Leadership ((JSL))

Abstract

Christopher Riddle considers some difficulties associated with attempting to make disabled people’s lives better or to do justice by them. Specifically, doing justice often risks stigmatizing people by making them the targets of a justice-based intervention. Even if one has the correct theory of justice, implementing changes that aim to make the world more just, e.g. for disabled people, could implicitly or explicitly express harmful attitudes. To illustrate this general point Riddle considers how efforts to implement various theories of justice can be demeaning to disabled people. He concludes, “Our attempts to articulate a conception of justice that promotes the well-being of people with disabilities and other marginalized individuals are aimed to do good. But … we need to be more cognizant of the process of ‘doing justice.’”

I would like to thank Sophie-Grace Chappell, Jessica Flanigan, David Gordon, Terry Price, Thomas Sturm, Jonathan Wolff, and audiences from McGill University, Concordia University, Université de Montréal, and Université du Québec à Montréal for helpful suggestions and comments.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This is similar to, but distinct from, the kind of harm one can risk doing to themselves by acknowledging difference that is discussed in Minow (1990, p. 3).

  2. 2.

    See Nozick (1974, pp. 265–268) for a discussion of this.

  3. 3.

    The idea of living a life worthy of human dignity and how it relates to justice stems from Nussbaum (2006, p. 74).

  4. 4.

    This instance of harm more closely resembles what is discussed in Minow (1990, p. 3).

  5. 5.

    Hence, I refer to Dworkin’s version of equality of resources as weak.

  6. 6.

    See the following for more on this: Riddle (2013a, c).

  7. 7.

    I refer to Rawls’s understanding of resources as strong because natural endowments can be viewed as resources under his conception of equality.

  8. 8.

    This, of course, may still be problematic for reasons specified by Nussbaum (2006, p. 16).

  9. 9.

    For more on this, see Riddle (2014, pp. 62–65) and Riddle (2013b).

  10. 10.

    Anderson responds to this criticism in great length and I discuss her response in greater detail in Riddle (2013b). In short, Anderson’s view suggests that capabilities, and more generally, justice, ought to concern relational equality fundamentally, and thus, the process by which we do justice is part of the central concern when establishing principles.

  11. 11.

    The phrasing of genuine opportunities for secure functionings comes from Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit (2008, p. 80).

  12. 12.

    For more on this, see Riddle (2014, pp. 59–75).

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Riddle, C.A. (2018). Disability and Doing Justice. In: Flanigan, J., Price, T. (eds) The Ethics of Ability and Enhancement. Jepson Studies in Leadership. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95303-5_4

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