Abstract
We are witnessing an unprecedented amount of activity in the area of controlling, limiting, or eliminating various weapons, but achieving the full benefit of these efforts remains elusive. While there is now an extraordinary push to ban nuclear weapons, with the hope of eventually eliminating them, a renewed focus on chemical weapons disarmament, and a recently concluded treaty on the arms trade, all of which promise global security benefits, entrenched national security positions and special interests make the realisation of these goals almost impossible to execute. Global institutional actors are addressing these issues, but achieving consensus among states and a real commitment to abide by agreements reached continue to be difficult. A case in point is the widening rift between nuclear and non-nuclear states, which threatens to derail the non-proliferation treaty. Nevertheless, there are some notable developments which serve to challenge the status quo. The first of these is the increased emphasis being placed on humanitarianism and international law; the second is the seemingly unstoppable march of non-governmental organisations into these debates and their articulation of new directional paths; the third factor is that public oversight of military spending is becoming more widespread, with growing requests for greater transparency and accountability on arms spending. While these are good indicators that change in arms control and disarmament policies is possible, it is unlikely that these goals can be reached without a fundamental reorganization of the current structural imbalances in world politics and the associated institutional agencies.
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Notes
- 1.
Humanitarian concerns have informed approaches to weapons in the past: early examples include the 1868 ‘Declaration of St Petersburg to the Effect of Prohibiting the Use of Certain Projectiles in Wartime’, and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which stigmatised the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare. Yet the application of international humanitarian law was widely ignored by many states for decades, and this has only been pronounced in the more recent treaties mentioned above.
- 2.
Attention to what are known as ‘inhumane’ conventional weapons, including landmines, was evident from the late 1970s, and the United Nations launched the 1980 ‘Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects’, (commonly known as the Inhumane Weapons Convention). However, this agreement has had only a limited effect, and the more recent conventions and treaties have eclipsed it.
- 3.
An excellent overview of the ATT is provided by the Arms Control Association 2016.
- 4.
It must be noted that while destruction of Syrian chemical weapons is a positive development, the deaths of up to 200,000 persons killed by conventional weapons in the Syrian conflict have gone relatively unremarked.
- 5.
The Landmine Monitor (2015) notes that there has been no ‘new use of antipersonnel landmines by a State Party’ and that the government forces of only three states continue to use landmines (Myanmar, Syria, and North Korea) although non-state agents continue to use them in up to 10 countries.
- 6.
The Cluster Munition Monitor (2015) records that 47 non-signatory states continue to stockpile cluster munitions, that they have been used in seven non-signatory states since the Convention entered into force in 2010 (in Cambodia, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, Sudan, South Sudan, and Yemen), and that ‘[s]ixteen countries continue to produce cluster munitions or reserve the right to produce in the future, but only three of these states are known to have used the weapon: Israel, Russia, and the United States’.
- 7.
The illegal trade in weapons is also, of course, substantial, if difficult to calculate.
- 8.
The United States remains the largest spender on defence, with US$581 billion spent in 2014; by comparison, the United Kingdom spent US$61.8 billion, Australia spent US$22.5 billion, Canada spent US$15.9 billion, and Austria spent US$3.3 billion (IISS 2015).
- 9.
It was Bull’s initial work on arms control that led to his growing interest in the wider questions of world order and international relations theory for which he is most remembered. His observations about the inequalities between states and the dominance of the great powers regarding nuclear weaponry steered him towards questions of order and justice in international relations.
- 10.
President Obama has brought a previously reluctant United States into the ATT, although US ratification is still a distant goal. Moreover, this was perhaps an exception rather than the rule: Obama has found it very difficult to push for change, and domestic politics within the United States together with the election of Donald Trump to the Presidency bode ill for any real change on these issues.
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Hanson, M. (2017). Global Weapons Proliferation, Disarmament, and Arms Control. In: Burke, A., Parker, R. (eds) Global Insecurity. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_10
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