Abstract
Zimmermann describes how, in the latter part of Mubarak’s rule, US aid came to support both limited development and a hierarchical relationship that was massively skewed toward Washington, entailing large concessions in Egypt’s sovereignty. Traditional forms of discretionary aid provided financial fuel for the Old Guard and the traditional state sector, while reform conditionality, parallel institutions, and technical assistance helped maintain pockets of efficiency that constituted limited gains in the state’s developmental capacity. However, these gains were jeopardized by disagreements over US democracy and governance activities, and then terminated by the Arab Spring protests and their aftermath.
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Zimmermann, A.M. (2017). US Aid to Egypt: Illusive Bargains. In: US Assistance, Development, and Hierarchy in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95000-3_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95000-3_11
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Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-94999-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95000-3
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