Abstract
This chapter explores how the concept of bureaucratic autonomy can be applied to the empirical study of international administrations. To this end, we start with an overview of classical Public Administration (PA) scholarship on bureaucratic autonomy. Based on what we consider the most relevant differences between the national and international spheres, we present a multidimensional concept of bureaucratic autonomy that is suitable for the analysis of international administrations. We then suggest a number of indicators that allow us to compare varying degrees of autonomy at different conceptual levels across administrations. Based on the data of 20 administrations, we illustrate possible causes and consequences of autonomy and lay out trajectories for future research.
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Bauer, M.W., Ege, J. (2017). A Matter of Will and Action: The Bureaucratic Autonomy of International Public Administrations. In: Bauer, M., Knill, C., Eckhard, S. (eds) International Bureaucracy. Public Sector Organizations. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94977-9_2
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