Abstract
This chapter treats of the manner in which Husserl handled the intending of impossible objects such as a round square, and elaborates precisely how intentionality can never intend a real relation in any founded manner, even though the ground and term of such a relation remain intendible. Then the phrase, “transcendent-in-immanence,” is defined formally as a core characteristic of adesse objectivity as proto-constituted by transcendental subjectivity. It is established that it is only within convergent phenomenology that the inner adesse of intentionality itself can be brought to descriptive clarity, and thus its essence can only be finally understood as re-worlding itself back in the Husserlian Lebenswelt.
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Ruddy, J. (2016). The Re-worlding of Intentionality. In: Being, Relation, and the Re-worlding of Intentionality. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94843-7_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94843-7_6
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Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-94842-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-94843-7
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