Abstract
Roy Harrod actively participated in the design and reform of the international financial architecture in the aftermath of World War II. On the basis of the ideas presented in the first edition of International Economics (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1933), Harrod developed a plan for reform which contributed, in no small manner, to shape Keynes views on his Clearing Union Plan (CU). Harrod’s plan was more comprehensive than that of Keynes focusing on a range of issues from price stabilization and investment to taxation, trade, labor, and nutritional standards. Harrod defended the Keynes Plan against that of Harry Dexter White and was ultimately disillusioned with the final agreement and the limited scope of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the 1950s, Harrod became convinced that the low level of world reserves was the main stumbling block facing developed economies and pushed to increase to price of gold to increase world liquidity in order to meet the growth in global transactions. Harrod also addressed the external sector predicament of developing countries and argued that the insufficiency of technical and entrepreneurial cadres, rather than an insufficiency of capital, was the major constraint on their economic development.
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Notes
- 1.
Harrod defined the debit index as the debit divided by the debit quota (the value of its external trade)…According to Harrod (1941a, p. 1): “A country should be said to be in default if its debit index is equal to three times the size of the sum of the debit of all countries in debit divided by one-half of the sum of the debit quotas of all the countries in the world.” Harrod later established that countries whose debt index exceeded twice the value of the average debit index for a year could be subject to supervision (Harrod 1941c).
- 2.
Harrod (1963 [1954], p. 105) describes Keynes’s influence as follows: “…Keynes, whose influence at this time was steadily growing. It is nor implied that all his specific theories were accepted. Of that small circle who bent their minds to these problems, it may well be that some disagreed with Keynes’ presuppositions…his premises…his modes of reasoning,…his conclusions…with his over-all theory, and yet held that by and large he was working in the right kind of direction…Keynes was the only person whose ideas were clearly defined and who could give them persuasive expression. Thus, there was a tendency to adopt his thoughts provisionally as the best available.” See also Harrod, November 18, 1941, letter to Sir Richard Hopkins.
- 3.
See Keynes (1980b, pp. 40–41, 66–68, 95–99). In his editorial notes, Moggridge does not mention Harrod as providing comments to the first draft of the CU. Given the evidence that Keynes and Harrod were engaging into discussions about post-World War II reform at least from the beginning of 1941, I have decided to include Harrod as a part of the group of economists that provided comments to Keynes’s first draft.
- 4.
The memorandum was meant to promote Anglo-American cooperation for growth, employment, and the expansion of trade as a part of the Atlantic Charter and Mutual Aid Agreement between the UK and the United States. The memorandum also includes a detailed plan to associate Alvin Hansen’s and Luther Gulick’s International Economic Board with the CU plan (Keynes 1942a, pp. 36–47). Hansen’s and Gulick proposed the International Economic Board as an advisory board to promote full employment, economic stability, and world trade (ibid., p. 77). Harrod proposed either to merge the International Economic Board with an Anglo-American Investment Board or to be set up as an independent institution. Harrod’s Anglo-American Investment Board is also included in Appendix III of the External Monetary and Economic Policy memorandum (pp. 78–84).
- 5.
See Horsefield (1969).
- 6.
See Keynes (1982), The Policy of Government Storage of Foodstuffs and Raw Materials (pp. 456–470) published in the Economic Journal, September 1938.
- 7.
Harrod thought that both of the above points were connected. Harrod stated: “I am tired of hearing about our balance of payment difficulties. I am sure that the Americans are…Keynes wisely suggests in his memorandum on the Bank that we should now treat this balance of payments question as a world problem, and not simply regard it from our own point of view. So far so good. But I think we must go further. The Americans might regard the Bank scheme simply as our plea for an easement of our difficulties nicely wrapped up in gold tinsel. It should therefore be accompanied by other schemes for the world economy not so closely connected with our personnel interest” (Harrod 1942c).
- 8.
These citations belong to the first and second draft of Keynes’s CU proposal. Similar statements can be found in the other drafts (i.e., Keynes 1980a, p. 133, third draft).
- 9.
Earlier on in February 1942, Keynes expressed the opinion that the right compromise was to secure an Anglo-American agreement for practical purposes and then invite the members of the Commonwealth, the Pan American Union and the countries fighting in the war including Russia, China, and Holland. Other countries could be brought into the scheme at a later stage. Keynes (1982, p. 107). Later in his reply to Harrod’s 4th May letter (Harrod 1942i), Keynes (1980a, p. 152) made the same point: “Where I unreservedly agree with you is that the actual constitution of particular plans must be agreed and established by a few cooks as possible, with other invited to the dinner table after they have smelt the broth.”
- 10.
According to Moggridge (Keynes 1980b, p. 105), Harrod was “…the strongest Whitehall advocate for strictly Anglo-American arrangements for post-war planning.”
- 11.
This does not mean that Harrod was not concerned with the fate of Russia or Europe. From early on Harrod thought that outlining a postwar policy for developing Central and South Eastern Europe to develop their industries and raise the standard of living was vital to maintaining peace in Europe and in the World. Harrod had made this point in a memorandum he submitted in December 1941, see Harrod (1942j).
- 12.
Keynes also remarked that Harrod’s relative index debit formula would be unintelligible to the average reader. However, it is hard to make sense of this criticism since the proposal was distributed to experts and not to the average layman.
- 13.
Keynes found nothing positive to say about Harrod’s paper (“In its present state it is only fit for the waste-paper basket, in my opinion…The paper is…a rigmarole…” Keynes 1942b, pp. 1 and 3). Keynes explained that the creditor–debtor scheme of the CU responded to his lack of faith in the efficacy of exchange rate variations. Keynes argued that lending by widening imbalances would undermine the credibility in the CU. He also mentioned that the fact that a country can increase its debit quota did not guarantee that it would be spent wisely (there was no way to control how it would be spent). Moreover, according to Keynes, establishing global institutions such as an International Investment Board while at the same time restricting its scope of action to prevent competition with the United States and the UK was “elfish and impertinent” and “outrageous and crazy” (ibid., p. 2).
- 14.
See Keynes (1980a, p. 68) and Skidelsky (2000, p. 220). At the time, exchange controls and capital controls were used interchangeably (Mitchener and Wandschneider 2014). Later on, commenting on Triffin’s National Central Banking and the International Economy (1947). Harrod voiced his opposition to exchange controls arguing that it was a drastic form of trade barrier and that in this sense it disseminated rather than counteracted depression (Harrod 1946–1947, p. 96).
- 15.
Harrod was a “lifelong Free Trader” (Harrod 1969, p. 218, note 1). Later on, Harrod noted that the difference between Keynes and Classical Economics was that he did not believe that the freedom of capital movements would not guarantee the best distribution and secure full employment (Harrod 1963 [1954], p. 90).
- 16.
In the memorandum on external monetary and economic policy, there are references to capital controls but viewed mainly as a tool to stop speculation (Keynes 1942b, pp. 2–3, Section 10).
- 17.
The name Bancor is derived from the French Banque-or (Bank gold or Bank gold money)
- 18.
Harrod held Harry Dexter White in high esteem for having convinced the people and Congress of the United States that international monetary cooperation was a pre-condition for global cooperation in trade and, also, for bringing the British to the negotiating table. Nonetheless, Harrod did not think highly of his knowledge of the monetary system or of his proposals (“…it does not seem that he had any great talent in his chosen sphere of interest. His drafts bear no traces of insight into the working of a monetary system. At best they were commonplace, and at worst cumbersome and impracticable,” Harrod 1965a, p. 133; 1963 [1954], pp. 103–104).
- 19.
Moggridge points out that Keynes showed a “carbon copy the scheme,” to Harrod and received suggestions to which he replied (Keynes 1980a, pp. 94 and 95–98).
- 20.
See also Harrod (1942l).
- 21.
According to Harrod, between 1948 and 1949 the United States ran a surplus in its basic balance (current account plus long-term capital flows) of US$4.186 billion. After the start of the Marshall Plan, the surplus turned to a deficit of US$3.318 billion between 1949 and 1951. However, some countries still felt a dollar shortage as their reserves were below their target levels. Between 1951 and 1957, the United States deficit averaged about US$800 million a year widening thereafter (see Harrod 1963 [1954], p. xvi). See also Dunn and Mutti (2000, p. 514).
- 22.
The scarce currency clause has never been used.
- 23.
This is currently equivalent to about US$122 billion (Steil 2013, p. 315). The Marshall Plan was signed into law as the Economic Cooperation Act by President Truman on 3 April 1948.
- 24.
See Article VII(b) of the Articles of Agreement (US Treasury, July 1944).
- 25.
Harrod lamented that the scarce currency clause was far removed from its original intentions: “Far different was the original conception that all should join together in limiting the purchases of a scarce currency and thus sharing the burden widely, instead of throwing it all onto those countries which happen, by the accident of the multilateral pattern of trade, to be in normal dollar deficit” (Harrod 1961a, p. 76).
- 26.
The rate of inflation in the United States measured by the consumer price index (1967-100) rose from 2.2% in 1945 to 8.5% in 1946 and 14.4% in 1947. The evolution United States business cycle during post-World War II shows an expansionary phase between October 1945 and November 1948 (37 months) fallowed by a recessionary phase lasting from November 1948 to October 1949 (11 months). See Campagna (1981, p. 293) and Economic Report of the President (1980).
- 27.
Convertibility refers to convertibility into other currencies. Only the United States maintained convertibility of its currency (the dollar) with respect to Gold (1 dollar = 35 ounces of Gold). Following the war, Britain also used controls to boost exports. According to Harrod, one of the most important was the allocation of materials. The car industry received steel only if the industry could show that a large part of its output was exported. Similarly, the pottery industry exported most of its output (Harrod 1963a, p. 126). The coexistence of convertibility of sterling balances within sterling area and non-convertibility outside the sterling area was also a form of protection: “This gave British exports an advantage; it was a kind of ‘protection’ for them in foreign markets. This must be a rare, perhaps unique, case of a country’s industries enjoying protection in foreign markets. Countries holding sterling balances, but short of dollars, would deflect, their purchases on to British goods even when they were more expensive” (Harrod 1963a, p. 127).
- 28.
The loan was agreed in December 1945 and signed into law on July 1946 and amounted to U$3750 million dollars. The agreement included making the pound convertible within a year and ending trade restrictions against the United States by the year 1956. Harrod agreed that convertibility was a priority but separated the convertibility of the currency issue from the suppression of trade controls. He thus advocated the return to convertibility with the retention of import controls (Harrod 1961a, p. 61; 1963a, p. 129; 1965b, p. 292).
- 29.
Between 1946 and 1949, the United States experienced a yearly surplus in the balance of payments of US$2 billion dollars. Between 1950 and 1956, the balance of payments yielded a deficit of US$1.5 billion which turned to a small surplus in 1957 (US$0.5 billion) and then returned to a deficit position between 1958 and 1960 (US$3.7 billion). See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (1961, p. 4).
- 30.
In 1965, total external liabilities to official foreigners exceeded the United States gold stock. The US$ gold stock of the United States fell from US$22.8 billion in December 1957 to US$16.0 and 10.4 billion dollars in December 1962 and 1968. By comparison, the money supply rose from US$135.9 to 193.1 billion dollars. See Federal Reserve Bulletin.
- 31.
Machlup (1962, p. 5) provides a threefold classification of the problems of post-World War II monetary architecture highlighting two important aspects of each. These three problems and their respective aspects are: (i) difficulties with the balance of payments of individual countries (due to excessive deficits or insufficient surpluses in the balance on current account and/or massive international movements of speculative funds); (ii) inadequacy of the growth of monetary reserves (relative to the demand for domestic liquidity and/or relative to the growth of foreign trade); (iii) fragility of the gold-exchange standard (which is dangerous to key-currencies countries and/or to countries holding large exchange reserves).
- 32.
This motive for holding reserves is very similar to Keynes’s necessary condition for the existence of liquidity preference “uncertainty as to the future of the rate of interest” (Keynes, GT, p. 168). After the Asian Crisis (1997) which was a balance of payments crisis developing countries increased significantly their levels of official reserves precisely for the reasons outlined by Harrod.
- 33.
Harrod’s 1953 IMF paper was written under an international context characterized by a dollar shortage. The report did not consider the export of US capital abroad which was started to occur in the middle of the 1950s decade and led to the opposite problem, a dollar glut. In his introduction to the IMF paper written later on in 1962 in Topical Comments, Harrod explained that one of the reasons that he did not consider US capital exports (i.e., outflows) was due to the fact that he did not consider this a long trade solution of the trade imbalance. Capital exports involve service charges and profits which “mount up over a term of years and in due course overtop the sums going out by way of investment” and this led to the opposite problem, a reverse imbalance, and a US external deficit. The imbalances persisted (Harrod 1961a, p. 15). See also Harrod (1953, 1954, 1958a, b).
- 34.
- 35.
Harrod hinted at the possibility that Great Depression was in part due to a shortage of gold.
- 36.
In his IMF paper, Harrod gives a lower ratio of gold monetary stocks to world imports (17.5%) in 1951 Harrod (1953, p. 3). According to data provided by Machlup (1962, p. 3, Table 1), the reserves of central banks and other monetary national institutions of the Western World were US$33.1 billion dollars and US$38.0 billion dollars in 1961 (an increase of only US$4.9 billion). The average increase for the entire period is less than half a billion dollars per annum. The average rate of change of gold reserves is 1.27% per year. In 1949 and 1960, gold reserves represented 64 and 49% of total reserves (including besides gold, exchange reserves, and gross IMF positions). This illustrates Harrod’s point of view. Harrod’s calculation assumes a direct functional relationship between reserves and imports (or trade). Triffin (1960) also made the same assumption. Other authors at the time including Machlup (1966) and Olivera (1969) questioned this direct proportionality. Machlup negated the existence of a relationship between the demand for reserves a set of identifiable variables. For Olivera, the demand for reserves is a function of the variance of annual changes in the level of imports. See Bahmani-Oskooee (1985) for a survey where these approaches are discussed.
- 37.
According to Harrod (ibid.) during 1950–1951, world trade increased by one third while gold production outside the United States and the USSR declined from US$928 to 762 million dollars. Also, he estimated that half of the world output in the period 1946–1951 (US$2677 out of 4790 million) went to private hoards.
- 38.
Deflation was “undesirable and impractical.” Deflation would go against the standing opinion and not only would force a recession in the United States trade partners but also in the United States itself. Harrod viewed trade restrictions as equivalent to a beggar-my-neighbor policy.
- 39.
Johnson (1970, p. 278) referred to this statement as a prophetic pronouncement.
- 40.
Jacques Rueff (1896–1978) and Michael Heilperin (1909–1971) shared the view of increasing the price of gold to boost up reserves and put an end to the dollar problem; however, they did not see it as a way to expand credit but rather as a measure to rehabilitate the gold standard (see Heilperin 1961a, b, 1962, 2007). A modern version of Harrod’s proposal to increase reserve and liquidity can be found in Davidson (1992).
- 41.
Obviously, the increase in the price of gold can create “net liquidity” to the extent that an increase in the money value of gold allows countries to repay their demand liabilities to those countries that hold foreign exchange reserves (Machlup 1962, p. 44).
- 42.
Harrod estimated that to get the same effect on reserves and liquidity through the liquidity facilities of the IMF would entail an increase in quotas of around 300% plus making drawing rights unconditional (Harrod 1965a, p. 81).
- 43.
In the same way, he remarked (1963a, p. 62): “Self-discipline is much more effective than attempts by an international committee to impose discipline.”
- 44.
This view is the opposite of the current mainstream consensus in macroeconomics and monetary policy. The consensus recognizes that central banks have a mandate for low and stable inflation but also to attenuate the fluctuations in the current level of output relative to its natural level. However, the consensus makes clear that the most important hierarchical objective is to maintain low and stable inflation. Moreover, the consensus sustains the notion that stabilizing inflation around its target is equivalent to stabilizing real output around its natural level or equivalence between nominal and real stability (the “divine coincidence”) (Blanchard 2006; Blanchard and Gali 2005). Harrod thought that putting inflation ahead of growth was to confuse the means with the objective.
- 45.
One of the objections to raising the price of gold was that it would benefit unwanted political regimes such as those of South Africa and Russia as major producers of gold. I am grateful to Tony Thirlwall for raising this point.
- 46.
According to Harrod, developing countries held less gold than their corresponding share. Developing country imports represented 22% of the world’s total and 18.1% of global reserves. But their gold holdings represented only 6.9% of the total (Harrod 1965a, p. 73).
- 47.
- 48.
Triffin’s analysis is known as “Triffin’s Dilemma,” see Triffin (1957, 1960, 1978). According to Altman (1961, p. 153), who first introduced the idea of the “dilemma,” the shortfall of reserves for the years 1958–1967 is estimated between US$6 and 17 billion. For Triffin, the internationalization of foreign exchange reserves would “facilitate the adjustment of the Fund’s lending operations to the legitimate liquidity requirements of an expanding world economy and help stabilize the world monetary system against the vicissitudes of national monetary management in the present key currency countries” (Triffin 1960, p. 146).
- 49.
Per Jacobsson (1894–1963) was Chairman of the Board and Managing Director of the IMF from 1956 until 1963. Karl Blessing (1900–1971) was a German banker worked at the Reichsbank from 1920 to 1939 and was president of the Deutsche Bundesbank from 1958 to 1969. Harrod remarked on the reaction of central bankers as follows; “The idea of initiating a large increase in world liquidity is alien to them” (Harrod 1965a, p. 162).
- 50.
Triffin argued that the revaluation of gold proposal would require a sharp increase of the price of gold in dollar terms, that it would lead to periodic revaluations and that these would lead to excess liquidity and that its benefits would be distributed “very haphazardly and.in the least desirable fashion” (Triffin 1960, p. 81). Harrod replied to the objections raised by Triffin in his review of Gold and the Dollar Crisis (Harrod 1961b) which are similar to his arguments included in Reforming the World’s Money (1965a) discussed above. He pointed out that the rise in the price of gold would increase production proportionately so that periodic revaluations would not be needed. Also, the temporary excess liquidity would be absorbed by an increase in trade. Finally, even though the initial benefits may be distributed arbitrarily these would eventually spill to all other countries through increased internal demand in the beneficiary countries, production, and trade. As he put it (1961b, p. 201): “Now the great benefit to be derived from the gold price re-evaluation must not be thought of as the initial once-over present made to existing gold-holders, but as the lasting benefit due to the effect of greater liquidity in increasing world trade and production. The needier countries would benefit in the best possible way, namely by the increased buying from them by the richer countries.”
Earlier on in his book Europe and the Money Muddle (1957, pp. 298–299), Triffin made a disparaging remark about the proposal to increase the price of gold: “…the barrenness of this proposal makes it most repugnant to those who think that the international need for liquidity can be put to better use that financing digging gold from the entrails of the earth and reburying it in the vaults of Fort Knox and other gold graves.” In his review of the book, Harrod (1958b, p. 538) rebutted this as “unadulterated prejudice and obscurantism.” He restated that the main benefits would be revalued the existing stocks of gold, discourage private hoarding, and encourage the increase of gold production.
- 51.
- 52.
The formula proposed by Harrod for the increase in quotas is complicated. He described it as follows (1965a, pp. 131–132): “I suggest that we should take a five-year average of the annual dollar value of imports preceding zero year…I year one we should take the average dollar value of world imports in the five preceding year one. The required proportionate in world reserves in year one should be taken to be equal to the proportionate rise of imports in the five years preceding over their value in the five years preceding zero year. And so on for subsequent years. The total value of this required rise in world reserves should be translated into an absolute amount of dollars. From this absolute amount should be subtracted the dollar value of gold accretions to monetary stocks in zero year. There should further be subtracted any addition to the dollar value of dollars and sterling…held in official reserves in zero year…There should also be subtracted loans and investment by I.M.F…This should give a workable formula which should be acceptable to all who do not desire that world reserves should fall relatively to the world turnover of international settlements.”
- 53.
Harrod argued that loans were exclusively a means to meet balance-of-payments difficulties and not to provide liquidity. He proposed that (op. cit., p. 153) “…from the sum total of quota increases, as previously authorized to occur at the beginning of the next year, there should be deducted a sum equal to the amount of loans made during the year by the I.M.F….the countries in special balance-of-payments difficulties in a given year would get a little more than their proportionate share of the new quantum of liquidity to be handed out.” Harrod considered that his proposal for loans and investments required a new article stating that (op. cit., p. 159): “…net loans and investments in any one year should never exceed, in total amount, the amount constituted by the increase of quotas already voted for the next following year; and the total amount constituted by the increase in quotas actually to be provided in the next year should be equal to the amount already voted, minus the net amount of loans and investments granted in the preceding year.”
- 54.
Machlup thought that the group should comprise non-governmental economists with well-known international monetary reform plans with diverging views (“The group included representatives of several feuding schools of thought…quite deliberately, it included extremists on matters of international monetary reform, advocates of the most irreconcilable plans. For only a direct confrontation of the divergent views could afford a full and fair analysis of the sources of disagreement,” Machlup 1964a, p. 1; 1965, p. 167). All the economists that participated were former members of the Federal Reserve, the IMF, the Bank for International Settlements and had been and continued to be advisors to their national government (Connell 2011). Harrod was both a former employee of the IMF and advisor to Harold McMillan.
- 55.
The economic objectives of the group included “a high and stable level of employment; the highest possible per capita income and a continuing special regard for poorer persons and nations” (Connell 2013, p. 270).
- 56.
- 57.
Harrod made qualifications (1973, p. 164) to the desirability of low-interest rate loans.
- 58.
Harrod also addressed this issue from the perspective of his Second Dynamic equation and the optimum rate of savings (Harrod 1966). I deal with this issue in Chapter 8 of this book (Further Developments in Dynamic Economics).
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Pérez Caldentey, E. (2019). The Reform of the Global Financial Architecture. In: Roy Harrod. Great Thinkers in Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-74085-7_7
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