Primitive Freedom and Human Dignity in Daoism: A Comparison with Rousseau

Abstract

This chapter completes the previous discussions on the idea of human dignity in Confucianism and Mohism, and focuses on the original contributions made by the early Daoist philosophers in aspects that had been ignored by the Confucians and the Mohists. The most unique contribution of Daoism is that it brings the individual person—simple, uncultivated and, perhaps, selfish person—to the center of moral philosophy. Explicitly for the first time, active fulfillment of social duties ceases to be the unquestioned ground for moral encomium; a person is no longer viewed primarily in terms of relationships to others, but in his own right—more precisely, in his personal relation to the Way, that is, both his destiny and origin of birth. Rather than asking what a person ought to do for his family, the community, and the state—in a word, for others, the Daoist is daring enough to question the very legitimacy of human obligations, and asks instead, what a person should do for his own sake. More than the utilitarian Mohist, the Daoist brings into doubt not only a particular moral code enacted for a people at any particular time, but morality in general, which in one way or another restricts a person’s primitive freedom to live as a natural animal. By criticizing the traditional morality and reviving the faith in a primitive, self-sufficient life, Laozi and Zhuangzi add an important dimension to the classical understanding of human dignity: individual freedom, particularly the freedom of living under the minimum burden, direction, and oppression of the state.