Abstract
As with the conflict in Vietnam, the Iraq War is often interpreted as an ominous indicator in terms of a democracy’s ability to defeat an insurgency, especially in a foreign land. If viewed through the wrong lens, it may appear to strengthen the (incorrect) lesson of Vietnam that such efforts are futile. Once again, the most powerful state in the world was prevented from reaching its war aims by a militarily weaker insurgent force in a developing country. At first glance, the ambivalent outcome of the war in Iraq is further proof that democracies can’t win counterinsurgencies and shouldn’t try. As with Vietnam, however, this is the wrong lesson to draw.
Unfortunately, the mistakes of Vietnam were re-made in Iraq. A conventional strategy was stubbornly clung to in the face of an irregular conflict. It took years for the proper adjustments to take place, years that placed Iraq, the US and its coalition partners on the path of defeat. Once those adjustments were made, the course of the war changed. The implementation of a proper counterinsurgency strategy prevented absolute defeat. Though it is hard to claim that success was achieved, it is readily apparent that major improvements in the situation were accomplished. The pre- and post-counterinsurgency eras in Iraq were vastly different in terms of outcomes, once again demonstrating the absolute imperative of getting the strategy right. In order for a democracy to win a counterinsurgency fight, it must implement a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy.
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Patterson, W. (2016). Iraq. In: Democratic Counterinsurgents. Rethinking Political Violence. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-60060-8_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-60060-8_6
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