Abstract
This chapter serves to outline a counterinsurgency strategy that builds from the work of earlier theorists as well as research by both academicians and practitioners that has developed in the wake of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. It offers a plausible framework for democracies to succeed in future counterinsurgency conflicts. The strategy outlined here will assume a certain type of insurgency—one in a foreign country in which the host government is being assisted by, or occupied by, a democratic country. This assumption is made because most counterinsurgency endeavors undertaken by democratic governments in recent decades have been of this type and it is the most likely form of insurgency to challenge democratic regimes in the future.
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Notes
- 1.
Merom, 230–1.
- 2.
Galula, 55.
- 3.
Galula, 4.
- 4.
Galula, 33.
- 5.
Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 73.
- 6.
Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 7–8.
- 7.
Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 10.
- 8.
United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1–3.
- 9.
United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1–4.
- 10.
The strategy described here is primarily drawn from the works of David Galula (especially the three primary categories) and David Kilcullen, along with content from FM 3–24.
- 11.
Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 7.
- 12.
Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 7.
- 13.
Galula, 75.
- 14.
United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1–131.
- 15.
James T. Quinlivan, ‘Force Requirements in Stability Operations’, Parameters 25 (Winter 1995): 2.
- 16.
James T. Quinlivan, ‘Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations’, RAND Review 27, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 29.
- 17.
Steven M. Goode, ‘A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency’, Parameters 39 (Winter 2009–10): 55.
- 18.
Goode, 55.
- 19.
Connable and Libicki, 138–9.
- 20.
Connable and Libicki, 140.
- 21.
United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1–142.
- 22.
Jason Lyall, Graeme Blair and Kosuke Imai, ‘Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan’, American Political Science Review 107, no. 4 (November 2013): 681.
- 23.
Lyall, Blair and Kosuke, 693.
- 24.
Record, 105–6.
- 25.
Lyall and Wilson III, 77.
- 26.
Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 266.
- 27.
United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 3–1.
- 28.
Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 31.
- 29.
Galula, 84.
- 30.
United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1–147.
- 31.
Charles F. Kriete, quoted in Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Random House, 1982), 34.
- 32.
T. X. Hammes, ‘The Future of Counterinsurgency’, Orbis 56 (Fall 2012): 571.
- 33.
United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1–51.
- 34.
Galula, 46.
- 35.
Galula, 52.
- 36.
United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1–124.
- 37.
Harold K. Johnson, Foreword to The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, by Richard L. Clutterbuck (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), x.
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Patterson, W. (2016). A Population-Centric COIN Strategy. In: Democratic Counterinsurgents. Rethinking Political Violence. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-60060-8_3
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