Abstract
The culmination of these policies of appeasement in Bosnia is addressed in this chapter. Here Mulchinock looks at three months (February/April/November) in 1994 when NATO and the international community fail to halt the aggressive behaviour of the Bosnian Serbs. This is explored from a number of different perspectives. While member state roles are again highlighted, the related mounting tensions between the UN and NATO’s political and military structures are further underlined. The handling of these events, over those three months, convince the Bosnian Serbs that they can heighten their aggressive behaviour and play mind games with both the UN and NATO. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the events of the summer of 1995 when the Srebrenica Massacre convinces the NATO allies that a more pro-active military response is now required.
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Mulchinock, N. (2017). Bosnia: Phase 2 and a More Pro-active Stance by the Alliance (1994–95). In: NATO and the Western Balkans. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59724-3_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59724-3_3
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Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-59723-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-59724-3
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