Advertisement

The Politics of Hydraulic Fracturing in Germany: Party Competition at Different Levels of Government

  • Jale Tosun
  • Achim Lang
Chapter

Abstract

Hydraulic fracturing has been practiced in Germany for decades, and several attempts have been made to legalize and regulate new drilling methods, which eventually led to the approval of a law to effectively ban this activity in 2016. In this study, we explore the characteristics of the German political debate on hydraulic fracturing. Our explanatory model, which is grounded in the advocacy coalition framework, is based on two arguments. First, the uncertainty surrounding the use and effects of hydraulic fracturing prompts opponents to argue for the use of the precautionary principle, which is typically invoked in German political discourse when effects are highly uncertain. Second, party competition takes place at the federal as well as the federal states level. The blurring of party competition boundaries typically leads to highly volatile advocacy coalitions.

Keywords

Hydraulic Fracture Precautionary Principle Environmental Impact Assessment Advocacy Coalition Discourse Network 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Aalto, Pami, and Dicle Korkmaz Temel. 2014. European Energy Security: Natural Gas and the Integration Process. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 52(4): 758–774.Google Scholar
  2. Andersen, Mikael Skou, and Duncan Liefferink. 1999. European Environmental Policy: The Pioneers. Manchester: Manchester University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Auel, Katrin. 2010. Between Reformstau and Länder Strangulation? German Co-Operative Federalism Re-Considered. Regional and Federal Studies 20(2): 229–249.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  5. Baur, Michael, Marc Benkert, Ulrik Brandes, Sabine Cornelsen, Marco Gaertler, Boris Köpf, Jürgen Lerner, and Dorothea Wagner. 2002. Visone Software for Visual Social Network Analysis. In Graph Drawing, ed. P. Mutzel, M. Jünger, and S. Leipert. Berlin: Springer.Google Scholar
  6. Benz, Arthur. 1999. From Unitary to Asymmetric Federalism in Germany: Taking Stock After 50 years. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 29(4): 55–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Brandes, Ulrik, Marco Gaertler, and Dorothea Wagner. 2003. Experiments on Graph Clustering Algorithms. In Algorithms – ESA 2003, ed. G. Di Battista and U. Zwick. Berlin: Springer.Google Scholar
  8. Brandes, Ulrik, Marco Gaertler, and Dorothea Wagner. 2007. Engineering Graph Clustering: Models and Experimental Evaluation. ACM Journal of Experimental Algorithmics 12(1.1): 1–26.Google Scholar
  9. Brandes, Ulrik, and Dorothea Wagner. 2004. Analysis and Visualization of Social Networks. In Graph Drawing Software, ed. M. Jünger and P. Mutzel. Berlin: Springer.Google Scholar
  10. Bräuninger, Thomas, and Marc Debus. 2008. Der Einfluss von Koalitionsaussagen, programmatischen Standpunkten und der Bundespolitik auf die Regierungsbildung in den deutschen Ländern. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 49(2): 309–338.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Bräuninger, Thomas, and Marc Debus. 2012. Parteienwettbewerb in den deutschen Bundesländern. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.Google Scholar
  12. Bräuninger, Thomas, and Thomas König. 1999. The Checks and Balances of Party Federalism: German Federal Government in a Divided Legislature. European Journal of Political Research 36(2): 207–234.Google Scholar
  13. Bundesumweltamt. 2014a. Fracking zur Schiefergasförderung - Eine energie- und umweltfachliche Einschätzung. Dessau-Roßlau: Bundesumweltamt.Google Scholar
  14. Bundesumweltamt. 2014b. Gutachten 2014: Umweltauswirkungen von Fracking bei der Aufsuchung und Gewinnung von Erdgas insbesondere aus Schiefergaslagerstätten. Dessau-Roßlau: Bundesumweltamt.Google Scholar
  15. Burkhart, Simone. 2009. Reforming Federalism in Germany: Incremental Changes Instead of the Big Deal. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 39(2): 341–365.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Davis, Charles. 2012. The Politics of “Fracking”: Regulating Natural Gas Drilling Practices in Colorado and Texas. Review of Policy Research 29(2): 177–191.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Dryzek, John S., Christian Hunold, David Schlosberg, David Downes, and Hans-Kristian Hernes. 2002. Environmental Transformation of the State: The USA, Norway, Germany and the UK. Political Studies 50(4): 659–682.Google Scholar
  18. Eckley, Noelle, and Henrik Selin. 2004. All Talk, Little Action: Precaution and European Chemicals Regulation. Journal of European Public Policy 11(1): 78–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. European Commission. 2000. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle. COM(2000)1. Brussels: European Commission.Google Scholar
  20. Eilders, Christiane. 2000. Media as Political Actors? Issue Focusing and Selective Emphasis in the German Quality Press. German Politics 9(3): 181–206.Google Scholar
  21. Engeli, Isabelle, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, and Lars Thorup Larsen. 2012. Theoretical Perspectives on Morality Politics. In Morality Politics in Western Europe: Parties, Agendas and Policy Choices, ed. I. Engeli, C. Green-Pedersen, and L.T. Larsen. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
  22. European Council. 2011. Conclusions of the Presidency. EUCO 2/11. Brussels: European Council.Google Scholar
  23. European Parliament. 2012. European Parliament Resolution of 21 November 2012 on the Environmental Impacts of Shale Gas and Shale Oil Extraction Activities. 2011/2308(INI). Brussels: European Parliament.Google Scholar
  24. Finkel, Madelon L., and Jake Hays. 2013. The Implications of Unconventional Drilling for Natural Gas: A Global Public Health Concern. Public Health 127(10): 889–893.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Gerring, John. 2007. Is There a (Viable) Crucial-Case Method? Comparative Political Studies 40(3): 231–253.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Howarth, Robert W., Anthony Ingraffea, and Terry Engelder. 2011. Natural Gas: Should Fracking Stop? Nature 477(7364): 271–275.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Jenkins-Smith, Hank, Daniel Nohrstedt, Christopher Weible, and Paul Sabatier. 2014. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Foundations, Evolution, and Ongoing Research. In Theories of the Policy Process, ed. C. Weible and P. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Wetsview Press.Google Scholar
  28. Jenkins-Smith, Hank, and Paul A. Sabatier. 1993. Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder, CO: Westview.Google Scholar
  29. Johnson, Corey, and Tim Boersma. 2013. Energy (in) Security in Poland the Case of Shale Gas. Energy Policy 53: 389–399.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Joskow, Paul L. 2013. Natural Gas: From Shortages to Abundance in the United States. The American Economic Review 103(3): 338–343.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Kotsakis, Andreas. 2012. The Regulation of the Technical, Environmental and Health Aspects of Current Exploratory Shale Gas Extraction in the United Kingdom: Initial Lessons for the Future of European Union Energy Policy. Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 21(3): 282–290.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Lehmbruch, Gerhard. 1978. Party and Federation in Germany: A Developmental Dilemma. Government and Opposition 13(2): 151–177.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Lehmbruch, Gerhard. 2000. Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat: Regelsysteme und Spannungslagen im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Leifeld, Philip. 2013a. Discourse Network Analyzer Manual. Dübendorf, Switzerland: Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology (Eawag), [Online: http://www.philipleifeld.de].
  35. Leifeld, Philip. 2013b. Reconceptualizing Major Policy Change in the Advocacy Coalition Framework: A Discourse Network Analysis of German Pension Politics. Policy Studies Journal 41(1): 169–198.Google Scholar
  36. Leifeld, Philip, and Sebastian Haunss. 2012. Political Discourse Networks and the Conflict Over Software Patents in Europe. European Journal of Political Research 51(3): 382–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Lieberman, Sarah, Tim Gray, and A.J.R. Groom. 2012. Moratoria in International Politics: A Comparative Analysis of the Moratoria on Genetically Modified Products and Commercial Whaling. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 14(4): 518–533.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Löfstedt, Ragnar E. 2004. The Swing of the Regulatory Pendulum in Europe: From Precautionary Principle to (Regulatory) Impact Analysis. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 28(3): 237–260.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. McGowan, Francis. 2014. Regulating Innovation: European Responses to Shale Gas Development. Environmental Politics 23(1): 41–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Monstadt, Jochen, and Stefan Scheiner. 2014. Allocating Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the German Federal System: Regional Interests and Federal Climate Governance. Energy Policy 74: 383–394.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Müller, Jochen. 2009. The Impact of the Socio-Economic Context on the Länder Parties’ Policy Positions. German Politics 18(3): 365–384.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Philippe and Partners. 2011. Final Report on Unconventional Gas in Europe. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/studies/doc/2012_unconventional_gas_in_europe.pdf.
  43. Pralle, Sarah B. 2003. Venue Shopping, Political Strategy, and Policy Change: The Internationalization of Canadian Forest Advocacy. Journal of Public Policy 23(3): 233–260.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Rinscheid, Adrian. 2015. Crisis, Policy Discourse, and Major Policy Change: Exploring the Role of Subsystem Polarization in Nuclear Energy Policymaking. European Policy Analysis 1(2): 34–70.Google Scholar
  45. Sabatier, Paul A., and Christopher M. Weible. 2007. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and Clarifications. In Theories of the Policy Process, ed. P.A. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
  46. Schirrmeister, Mira. 2014. Controversial Futures—Discourse Analysis on Utilizing the “Fracking” Technology in Germany. European Journal of Futures Research 2(1): 1–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Sotirov, Metodi, and Michael Memmler. 2012. The Advocacy Coalition Framework in Natural Resource Policy Studies—Recent Experiences and Further Prospects. Forest Policy and Economics 16: 51–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Tosun, Jale. 2013a. How the EU Handles Uncertain Risks: Understanding the Role of the Precautionary Principle. Journal of European Public Policy 20(10): 1517–1528.Google Scholar
  49. Tosun, Jale. 2013b. Risk Regulation in Europe: Assessing the Application of the Precautionary Principle. New York: Springer.Google Scholar
  50. Tosun, Jale. 2015. Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing: The Effects of Issue Redefinition. In Energy Policy Making in the EU, ed. J. Tosun, S. Biesenbender, and K. Schulze. London: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. Uliasz-Misiak, Barbara, Andrzej Przybycin, and Bogumila Winid. 2014. Shale and Tight Gas in Poland—Legal and Environmental Issues. Energy Policy 65: 68–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. van Asselt, Marjolein B.A., and Ellen Vos. 2006. The Precautionary Principle and the Uncertainty Paradox. Journal of Risk Research 9(4): 313–336.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  53. Weible, Christopher M. 2008. Expert-Based Information and Policy Subsystems: A Review and Synthesis. Policy Studies Journal 36(4): 615–635.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. Weible, Christopher M., Paul A. Sabatier, and Kelly McQueen. 2009. Themes and Variations: Taking Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Policy Studies Journal 37(1): 121–140.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  55. Weijermars, Ruud, and Crispian McCredie. 2011. Assessing Shale Gas Potential. Petroleum Review 2011(Oktober): 24–25.Google Scholar
  56. Zander, Joakim. 2010. The Application of the Precautionary Principle in Practice: Comparative Dimensions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jale Tosun
    • 1
  • Achim Lang
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute for Political ScienceHeidelberg UniversityHeidelbergGermany
  2. 2.Institute of Public ManagementZurich University of Applied SciencesWinterthurSwitzerland

Personalised recommendations