Abstract
Having discussed how it is that artists and audiences may collectively agree on what is happening, this chapter considers how particular means of representation (i.e., employing visually unrealistic puppets) encourage forms of imaginative spectatorship that are playful and pleasurable. We apply Apter’s theory of cognitive synergy to audience’s experience of puppet and horse to describe the overlapping but synaptic identities, and consider ways the puppeteers and production navigate the simultaneous expression of these dual identities to their mutual benefit. We conclude by analysing theories of perceptual affinity proposed by Mori and Cross et al. to suggest that Handspring’s puppets foster strong affective responses because they are “optimally discrepant” from realistic forms of representation.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
2. “[W]hen the audience becomes engaged with the micromovement of a puppet’s performance, spoken dialogue tends to fade from consciousness, as if it has been bleached out of the performance. Often we hear the comment: ‘lovely puppets, pity about the text.’ Most often this remark is made not because the text is poor, but because it is hard to really hear or apprehend the text when one becomes fully engaged with, even mesmerized by, this more profound level of performance” (Jones 256).
- 3.
3. It has become increasingly common for cognitive theorists in theatre studies to apply Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of conceptual blending in our joint, fluid perception of actors and characters. Roughly, Conceptual Blending Theory (or CBT) proposes that complex conceptual schema may be thought to blend and unblend in our minds, much like colours of paint on a palette. Our knowledge of the dramatic fiction, for instance, may fluidly intermingle with our knowledge of the actor’s real-world circumstances. The objects of our attention and the contents of our thought would therefore be subject to novel recombinations over time. Nevertheless, while CBT provides a canny phenomenological account for our experience of complex phenomena like acting, its further applications are limited, as Vervaeke and Kennedy suggest that CBT is not a falsifiable theory. Among their objections, they argue that the “input spaces” and “blended spaces” that differentiate and unite cognitive schema are mere allegories without any clear neurological or phenomenological correlates. It is also unclear how the mind governs either the admittance or removal of information into or out of these spaces. The perceptual framework we propose here is rooted in the falsifiable studies of motor cognition and describes a similar range of phenomena. These processes may very well be the mechanism underlying CBT, but for the time being, we simply decline to adopt that framework.
- 4.
4. All observers were non-experts, incapable of performing the robotic sequence.
References
Apter, Michael J. Danger: Our Quest for Excitement. Oxford: Oneworld P, 2007.
Apter, Michael J. “Metaphor as Synergy.” Metaphor: Problems and Perspectives. Ed. David Miall. Sussex: Harvester P, 1982, 55–70.
Cross, Emily S., Antonia F. de C. Hamilton, and Scott T. Grafton. “Building a Motor Simulation De Novo: Observation of Dance by Dancers.” NeuroImage 31: 2006, 1257–1267. Online.
Cross, Emily S., Roman Liepelt, Antonia F. de C. Hamilton, Jim Parkinson, Richard Ramsey, Waltraud Stadler, and Wolfgang Prinz. “Robotic Movement Preferentially Engages the Action Observation Network.” Human Brain Mapping 2012, 1–17.
De Jaegher, Hanne and Ezequiel Di Paolo. “Participatory Sense-making: An Enactive Approach to Social Cognition.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6: 2007, 485–507.
Gallese, Vittorio, Christian Keysers, and Giacomo Rizzolatti. “A Unifying View of the Basis of Social Cognition.” TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences 8(9): 2004, 396–403.
Jeannerod, Marc. Motor Cognition: What Actions Tell the Self. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006.
Kohler, Adrian. “Thinking Through Puppets.” Handspring Puppet Company. Ed. Jane Taylor. New York: David Krut, 2009, 42–150.
Landau, Emily. “Argument: Why War Horse’s Puppets Win by Flaunting Their Artificiality.” Toronto Life, 8 February 2012.
Loveridge, Lizzie. “War Horse, a CurtainUp London Review.” CurtainUp, The Internet Theater Magazine of Reviews, Features, Annotated Listings, 17 October 2007. http://www.curtainup.com/warhorseny.html - Original London Review
Millar, Mervyn. Personal Email Correspondence. 29 June 2015 (2015).
Smith, Peter. “Social and Pretend Play in Children.” The Nature of Play: Great Apes and Humans. Eds Anthony Pellegrini and Peter Smith. New York: Guildford P, 2005, 173–209.
Vervaeke, John. “Chi Explained Without Magic.” Performing Philosophy Symposium. University of Toronto, Toronto, October 2011. Lecture.
Vervaeke, John. “Three Visions of the Nature of Cognitive Science.” UTISM. University of Toronto, Toronto. July 2010. Lecture.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2016 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Malone, T., Jackman, C. (2016). Animated Horse Play. In: Adapting War Horse. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59475-4_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59475-4_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-59474-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-59475-4
eBook Packages: Literature, Cultural and Media StudiesLiterature, Cultural and Media Studies (R0)