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Anti-Money Laundering pp 323–367Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Recommendations and Conclusion

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The four famous FIU models in the world are critically analysed in Chap. 4.

  2. 2.

    The term “strategic analysis” has been analysed in Chap. 4.

  3. 3.

    These deficiencies and the lack of legal mechanisms have been critically evaluated throughout Chaps. 5 and 6.

  4. 4.

    Paul Allan Schott, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (Second Edition and Supplement on Special Recommendation IX, 2006 The World Bank), VII–18.

  5. 5.

    See (n 742) of Chap. 6.

  6. 6.

    According to the 2010 statistics, there are 55 banks in the UAE. See Chap. 6.

    In addition, the number of banks, in the UAE, in detail is available on the Central Bank website at: www.centralbank.ae (accessed on 11th April 2015).

  7. 7.

    In 2011 alone, the reporting entities, in the UAE, submitted 2576 STRs to the AMLSCU. See chart.1 in Chap. 6.

  8. 8.

    Where just 4 member states of the Egmont Group adopt the judicial/prosecutorial FIU model. See Chap. 4 (n 477).

  9. 9.

    For the FATF Recommendations, which deal with international co-operation, see Chap. 4 (n 312).

  10. 10.

    See www.mof.gov.ae (accessed on 24th April 2015).

  11. 11.

    See (n 320) of Chap. 4.

  12. 12.

    ‘The United Arab Emirates Mutual Evaluation Report, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism’ as produced by the FATF on 20 June 2008, 26.

  13. 13.

    See (n 580) of Chap. 5.

  14. 14.

    See (n 588) of Chap. 5.

  15. 15.

    Article 1 of the FLMLC 2002, see (n 597) of Chap. 5.

  16. 16.

    Article 1 of CBR 24/2000, see (n 538) of Chap. 5.

  17. 17.

    Article 2 (2) of the FLMLC 2002, see (n 600) of Chap. 5.

  18. 18.

    It is worth noting that the MLR 2007 defines the term “ML” in a way that does not conflict with the definition contained in the POCA 2002. See (n 788) of Chap. 7.

  19. 19.

    The MLR 2007 provides a clear definition for the CDD procedures, as analysed in Chap. 7.

  20. 20.

    Topic 3 of Addendum 2922/2008 which amended Article 5 (1) of Regulation 24/2000.

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    Topic 4 (c) of Addendum 2922/2008.

  23. 23.

    Topic 4 (a) of Addendum 2922/2008.

  24. 24.

    While the MLR 2007 contains a clear definition and states the components for those two terms. See (n 832) of Chap. 7.

  25. 25.

    Topic 11 of Addendum 2922/2008.

  26. 26.

    Topic 11 of Addendum 2922/2008. See Chap. 5.

  27. 27.

    This is in contrast to the UK’s system where the FCA can impose financial penalties on reporting entities, which do not fulfil SAR/AML requirements. See Chap. 7.

  28. 28.

    This is in contrast to the UK’s system where there are three sections contained in the POCA 2002, which govern the basis of SARs on ML, namely s.330, s.331 and s.332 of the POCA 2002. See Chap. 8.

  29. 29.

    See (n 529) of Chap. 5

  30. 30.

    See ((n 530) of Chap. 5.

  31. 31.

    See (n 595) of Chap. 5.

  32. 32.

    Ibid.

  33. 33.

    As analysed in Chap. 8, s.331 of the POCA 2002 criminalises a nominated officer in the regulated sector if he failed to submit a SAR to the NCA and s.332 criminalises other nominated officers in other circumstances.

  34. 34.

    Topic 6 of Addendum 2922/2008, see (n 650) of Chap. 5.

  35. 35.

    Article 15 of the FLMLC 2002. See Chap. 5.

  36. 36.

    The AMLSCU received 80,592 STRs about ML from the reporting entities. Despite this large number of STRs, only 285 STRs were transmitted to the Public Prosecution Office.

  37. 37.

    Topic 8 of Addendum 2922/2008, see (n 658) of Chap. 5.

  38. 38.

    Such issue has been critically analysed in Chap. 9.

  39. 39.

    See (n 623) of Chap. 5.

    In addition, the FATF Recommendation 21(a) provides such good faith immunity, see (n 346) of Chap. 4.

  40. 40.

    Ibid.

  41. 41.

    This is unlike to the UK’s system which requires such requirement. See Chap. 8.

  42. 42.

    Topic 7 of Addendum 2922/2008, see (n 661) of Chap. 5.

  43. 43.

    Article 15 of the FLMLC 2002, as critically evaluated in Chap. 5.

  44. 44.

    See (n 683) of Chap. 5.

  45. 45.

    Form (CB9/200/6), see (n 650) of Chap. 5.

  46. 46.

    Article 8 of ESCA Regulation 17/2010, see (n 685) of Chap. 5.

  47. 47.

    The UK’s SARs standard form comprises seven separate models, which are produced by the UK FIU. See Chap. 9.

  48. 48.

    It is worth noting that the POCA 2002 provides the term “as soon as is practicable.” See the conditions of s.330, s.331 and s.332 which have been analysed in Chap. 8.

  49. 49.

    This is unlike the UK’s system which criminalises tipping off any person. See Chap. 8.

  50. 50.

    Topic 9 of Addendum 2922/2008, see (n 665) of Chap. 5.

  51. 51.

    Article 15 (6) of CBR 24/2000, see (n 624) of Chap. 5

  52. 52.

    See www.mof.gov.ae (accessed on 16th April 2015).

  53. 53.

    The AMLSCU received 80,592 STRs about ML from the reporting entities. Despite this large number of STRs, only 285 STRs were transmitted to the Public Prosecution Office.

  54. 54.

    Only 20 out of the 285 STRs received by the Public Prosecution Office were sent to the courts. In addition, only 7 % out of the 20 STRs resulted in a conviction.

  55. 55.

    As occurred in Attorney general v Others, Dubai Court Judgment, Criminal Division, case No. 370/2008, see (n 711) of Chap. 5.

  56. 56.

    FATF Report, ‘Money Laundering through the Football Sector’ July 2009, available online at:

    http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20through%20the%20Football%20Sector.pdf (accessed on 15th July 2015).

  57. 57.

    FATF Report, ‘Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods’ October 2010, available online at:

    http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20using%20New%20Payment%20Methods.pdf (accessed on 15th July 2015).

  58. 58.

    Which has experienced an attempt to launder money through the purchase of a famous Italian football team. For further details, see FATF Report, ‘Money Laundering through the Football Sector’ (n 1408) 20.

  59. 59.

    Which has witnessed the laundering of illegal gambling proceeds through prepaid cards and illegal online steroid sales. For further details, see FATF Report, ‘Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods’ (n 1409) 37.

  60. 60.

    Which has experienced the laundering of drug proceeds through prepaid cards. For further details, see FATF Report, ‘Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods’ (n 1409) 38.

  61. 61.

    Which has witnessed the laundering of illegal proceeds from mis-utilised company assets to fund a football club. For further details, see FATF Report, ‘Money Laundering through the Football Sector’ (n 1408) 17.

  62. 62.

    See (n 745) of Chap. 6.

  63. 63.

    Similar to the SARs Regime Committee in the UK, as analysed in Chap. 9.

  64. 64.

    This was confirmed by Mr. Z from the banking sector. See Chap. 6.

  65. 65.

    See www.centralbank.ae (accessed on 16th April 2015).

  66. 66.

    Mr. A. from the AMLSCU confirmed that the AMLSCU uses more than 80 examiners from the Central Bank in order to conduct its analytical function on behalf of the AMLSCU.

  67. 67.

    Article 10 of the FLMLC 2002, see (n 635) of Chap. 5.

  68. 68.

    Article 9 of the FLMLC 2002, see (n 634) of Chap. 5.

  69. 69.

    Article 10 of the FLMLC 2002.

  70. 70.

    As Mr. A, from the AMLSCU, stated in Chap. 6.

  71. 71.

    The UK FIU provides bulletins to the reporting entities. See Chap. 9.

  72. 72.

    This is the same under the UK SARs regime. See Chap. 9.

  73. 73.

    Interpretative Note to FATF Recommendation 29, see (n 514) of Chap. 4.

  74. 74.

    See (n 745) of Chap. 6.

  75. 75.

    Article 8 (1) of the FLMLC 2002, see (n 686) of Chap. 5.

  76. 76.

    FATF Recommendation 29 has been critically analysed in Chap. 4.

  77. 77.

    See (n 502) of Chap. 4.

  78. 78.

    This is the same under the UK SARs regime where annual reports are publicly available on the NCA (UK FIU) website.

  79. 79.

    As critically evaluated in Chap. 4. Under UK FIU law enforcement model, it can freeze suspicious transactions, as critically analysed in Chap. 8.

  80. 80.

    Examples of such problems have been analysed in the Chap. 9.

  81. 81.

    Under the UK SARs regime, s.336 (5–6) of the POCA 2002 provides that a nominated officer will commit an offence if he granted consent to do the prohibited act, although he knows or suspects that he has to obtain actual consent from the NCA or deemed consent. See (n 1119) of Chap. 8.

  82. 82.

    Namely cases no. 2901/2005 and no. 370/2008 of Dubai Court Judgments, Criminal Division.

  83. 83.

    As Mr. L stated in Chap. 6.

  84. 84.

    As Mr. N stated in Chap. 6.

  85. 85.

    Which are in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah.

  86. 86.

    Similar to ARENA model in the UK’s system.

  87. 87.

    See (n 746) of Chap. 6.

  88. 88.

    Which have been analysed throughout Chaps. 5 and 6.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dubai Public Prosecution, SHARJAH, UAE

    Dr. Waleed Alhosani (Assistant Chief Prosecutor)

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Alhosani, W. (2016). Recommendations and Conclusion. In: Anti-Money Laundering. Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59455-6_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59455-6_10

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