Abstract
Using a unique data set on 49,355 high-value procurements, this chapter provides systematic evidence on favoritism in public procurement in Turkey. The yearly total of high-value public procurements, as the major area of transfers controlled by the government, has tripled in eight years. This development went hand in hand with unceasing legal amendments that increased the share of procurements that fall under the less transparent and less competitive procurement methods. The firms connected to AKP enjoyed high levels of discretion and higher contract prices in public procurements compared with the non-connected other firms. The use of public procurement for rent creation and distribution was extensive, particularly in the construction and the services sector through the TOKİ projects and the Municipal procurements.
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Notes
- 1.
The basic statistics for procurements below TL 1 million thresold are available on request.
- 2.
For detailed information on the concept of “opportunity spaces” see Yavuz (2003).
- 3.
For an in-depth case study of CSO–political party relations in an industrial periphery of Istanbul, see Ocaklı (2015).
- 4.
For a recent analysis of the “connections” of Ensar Vakfı see “Ensar’dan geçen yollar AKP’ye çıkıyor: Ensar Vakfı’nın ilişkilerinin haritası ve analizi” BirGün 19.04.2016.
- 5.
Information given by a TÜRKONFED official.
- 6.
Interview with the Ministry of EU Affairs officials.
- 7.
See for instance TEPAV report on legal amendments made to the PPL.
- 8.
Graphs are not demonstrated here. It is a separate work in progress conducted on the full goods and services data both above and below TL 1 million. Currently, the contract-awarded firms’ political connections for low value contracts are being searched.
- 9.
Googling the words “adrese teslim ihale” turns out dozens of such cases revealed by the media.
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Gürakar, E.Ç., Bircan, T. (2016). Redistribution or Crony Capitalism? Favoritism in Public Procurement Contract Award Processes. In: Politics of Favoritism in Public Procurement in Turkey. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59185-2_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59185-2_4
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