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Rationality, Representation, and Race pp 143–197Cite as

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The Origin of Mind

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Abstract

To this point, I have examined the distortions produced by conceiving of reason in modern terms. I have argued that in a so-called Age of Equality only some humans count as persons having equal worth. I have considered how post-Cartesian attacks on modern epistemologies undermine key pillars of support for formulations of race. What I have yet to do is determine, in the wake of modernism’s crumbling foundations, how we retain the normative force of moral terms like ‘justice’ while eliminating unsavory biases concerning who is deserving of justice. As I have discussed, one avenue for redress comes via mainstream criticisms of Cartesianism which challenge introspection, isolation, and representationalism and which challenge the idea that reason can be self-justifying. These objections entail an expansion of reason beyond logical methodologies for they insist that our concept of reason emphasizes embeddedness in a material and social world. While this allows us to recognize the importance and ineliminability of bias, it also weakens the normative force of moral concepts. In particular, the turning of attention outward allows for greater possibilities for diversity, but it also allows for greater possibilities for cultural relativism. Reason may no longer be wedded to internal procedures that are detached from the surrounding world, but it is also no longer wedded to pretensions of a God’s eye perspective, which in the past offered some hope of objectivity. Even though these anti-Cartesian alternatives do provide a pathway to a new understanding of reason, they do not solve every difficulty. More to the point, we may be stuck with perspectivalism, but if we want substantive moral concepts, we must be capable of defending them in ways that transcend our own particular biases.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The Greeks often speak of the soul rather than mind, and some slippage in terminology is unavoidable in this discussion.

  2. 2.

    As Snell explains, ‘Homer lacks a knowledge of the spontaneity of the human mind; he does not realize that decision of the will, or any impulses or emotions, have their origin in man himself. What holds true of the events in the epic holds also for the feelings, the thoughts and the wishes of the characters; they are inextricably linked with the gods’ (1982, 31).

  3. 3.

    For more on the Greek invention of mind, see Snell 1982.

  4. 4.

    See Asher-Greve 1997, 434.

  5. 5.

    Also see Heraclitus DK B45 (Kahn 1979, 45). He is the first to state explicitly that the soul has depth.

  6. 6.

    For a summary of the literature on Homer’s view of the soul, see Katona 2002.

  7. 7.

    See Snell 1982, 14–16. Also, Robb indicates that these psychological terms can be conceptualized as designating physical organs, as functions for which the organs are responsible, or as quasi-personal agents. See Robb 1986, 319.

  8. 8.

    Taylor indicates that other scholars have objected to Snell’s characterization of the difference of Homeric man. See Taylor 1989, 118.

  9. 9.

    For example, with the phrase ‘The thymos left his bones,’ Snell argues that ‘since this organ … determines physical motion, it is plausible enough to say that at the point of death the thymos leaves the bones and the … limbs with their muscles’ (1982, 9–10).

  10. 10.

    See Robb 1986, 319; Taylor 1989, 118. Or, as Snell explains, ‘As soon as we attempt to describe the mental concepts of Homer by means of the catchwords ‘organ’ and “function” we are bound to encounter terminological difficulties such as always arise for anyone who wishes to reproduce foreign idioms and peculiarities within the terms of his own tongue’ (1982, 15).

  11. 11.

    As Katona explains, ‘Besides difficulties of grasping an incorporeal agent, Presocratic thinkers depict the soul of the “individual” as being essentially connected with [or even being a part of] a larger, cosmic order or element outside’ (2002, 38).

  12. 12.

    Psyche does survive death for the archaic Greeks, but since it is not the repository of one’s personality, personality does not survive death. See Snell 1982, 14.

  13. 13.

    According to Robb (1986), Heraclitus is the pivotal figure in the transition between earlier conceptions of soul and the Socratic conception. While Robb explicitly defends a psychological deception of psyche against a physiological one, that he must argue so strongly against physiological interpretations demonstrates how strong the connection between mind and body is during this period in philosophy.

  14. 14.

    For more on the eschatological aspect of psyche, see Snell 1982, 17–19.

  15. 15.

    I will discuss Fragment 107 shortly, which Kahn claims is the first linkage of psyche with cognition in the extant literature. See Kahn 1979, 107.

  16. 16.

    Wheelwright 1959, 20.

  17. 17.

    Kahn 1979, 81.

  18. 18.

    Robb 1986, 339.

  19. 19.

    DK B101 says: ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν. Also see DK B45 (Kahn 1979, 45 or Wheelwright 1959, 58).

  20. 20.

    Also see Robinson 1986, 306.

  21. 21.

    Kahn 1979, 106. For more on interpretations of this passage see Wilcox 1991. Robb also discusses the interpretive issues at 1986, 327–334.

  22. 22.

    See DK B50 (Kahn 1979, 45).

  23. 23.

    See Kahn 1964.

  24. 24.

    See Robinson 1986, 311.

  25. 25.

    See Burnet 1916, 25.

  26. 26.

    The same sort of amazement is expressed in the Republic. See Plato 1961f, 608d.

  27. 27.

    See Plato 1961a, 30d.

  28. 28.

    See Plato 1961a, 40d–41b; Plato 1961d 63b-c.

  29. 29.

    For a summary of Homeric views on life after death, see Katona, who says: ‘Immortality in the Homeric sense is not the immortality of a “soul” capable of surviving the body’s death, but the translation of the whole person into a new mode of existence shared with gods; the whole person continues living in a new existence’ (2002, 35).

  30. 30.

    That Plato is somewhat ambivalent about the tripartite soul is something I will discuss shortly. However, according to Hall,

    The tripartite doctrine of soul is introduced in a tentative, halting manner (Republic, IV, 435 C-D) indicating its probability rather than certainty. The soul is not divided literally into three separate and distinct parts. [The terms are] used only as a convenient term to describe different aspects or features of the soul. (1963, 69 n1)

    For more on the debate over the unity of Platonic soul, see Hall 1963; Gerson 1987; Robinson 1990.

  31. 31.

    See Plato 1961a, 30a-b; 1961d, 64e-65a.

  32. 32.

    He reiterates this idea in Meditation VI. See Descartes 1984, 59.

  33. 33.

    See Plato 1961h, 41c-d, 69c-d, 90a. Also consider Descartes, who says in the Meditations, ‘the body is by its very nature always divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible’ (1984, 59).

  34. 34.

    See Plato 1961h, 91a; Plato 1961c, 944d-e.

  35. 35.

    See Plato 1961b, 505b.

  36. 36.

    See Spelman 1988, 27–31.

  37. 37.

    For example, see Plato 1961f, 395e, 455e; Plato 1961d, 60a; Plato 1961a, 35b; Plato 1961c, 836e, 944d-e; Plato 1961h, 91a.

  38. 38.

    See Plato 1961f, 455d-e.

  39. 39.

    Here the contrast with Kant is stark, considering Kant’s mockery of women who attempt to act like men by practicing philosophy. Such women ‘might as well even have a beard’ (Kant 1960, 78).

  40. 40.

    See Plato 1961f, 454d.

  41. 41.

    For more on Plato’s attitudes toward Greeks versus barbarians, see Kamtekar 2002.

  42. 42.

    See Aristotle 1941e, 1259b20-60b7.

  43. 43.

    This may sound counterintuitive given Aristotle’s remarks on women and slaves when compared to the moderns ‘universal rights of man’ talk. As I have already argued, however, the moderns are not as egalitarian as they appear, and as I will argue, an Aristotelian-styled virtue need not be as narrow as Aristotle portrays it. We live in a world that looks out other windows and has other biases. Such differences matter.

  44. 44.

    Aristotle 1941e, 1259b28-9. Of course, Kant does allow women their own virtue. Less clear is whether non-whites, especially those near the bottom of the hierarchy, are allowed virtue.

  45. 45.

    Aristotle 1941a, 402a10-11.

  46. 46.

    A good place to begin in examining interpretations of De Anima in particular is Nussbaum and Rorty 1992. For further discussions of the relationship of soul and body in Aristotle, see Sorabji Heinaman, Ackrill, Burnyeat, Whiting, and Barnes.

  47. 47.

    Aristotle does claim in De Anima that nous is immaterial (see 1941a, 413b24). I will discuss this issue shortly.

  48. 48.

    While arguing for a quasi-Wittgensteinian interpretation, Nussbaum explains that

    Aristotle preserves the non-reducibility and … the experienced complexity of intentional phenomena such as perception, belief, and desire, criticizing both materialist reductionism and Platonist intellectualism for their inability to offer a causal explanation of motion that captures the richness and relevance of ordinary discourse about motion and action. (Nussbaum and Putnam 1992, 50)

  49. 49.

    Also see 416b17-20.

  50. 50.

    Here Aristotle does distinguish nous from body. I will discuss the difficulty of this passage in the following section.

  51. 51.

    See Aristotle 1941a, 412a17-30.

  52. 52.

    Sorabji argues that these capacities, as parts of the soul, simply are the soul. See Sorabji 1974, 64–65.

  53. 53.

    See Aristotle 1941a, 413b12–15.

  54. 54.

    See Aristotle 1941a, 414b17–415a12.

  55. 55.

    See Aristotle 1941c, 1029a3-4.

  56. 56.

    For more on this, see Nussbaum and Putnam 1992, 30.

  57. 57.

    Many interpreters of Aristotle believe he offers a clear alternative to Descartes. See Barnes, Kahn, Frede, and Sorabji.

  58. 58.

    What his account really has going for it is that he addresses the problem of mind/body unity head-on. Kahn, in particular, tells us that ‘Aristotle offers us the best alternative to the dualist and anti-dualist theories of mind that have plagued philosophy with persistent and fruitless conflict for more than three centuries’ (1992, 359). In other words, even if Aristotle’s account of the unity of mind and body is ultimately less than satisfactory, it is still more satisfactory than alternative accounts.

  59. 59.

    See Aristotle 1941a, 413b24.

  60. 60.

    Aristotelian essences are altered by evolutionary theory, and this will be a topic that I discuss in the following chapter, where I argue for a contemporary account of virtue.

  61. 61.

    See Aristotle 1941a, 414a5-28.

  62. 62.

    There is also an argument for the interaction of soul and body based on Aristotle’s account of desire as a physiological process, but I will not discuss it here. See Sorabji 1974, 85–86.

  63. 63.

    See Aristotle 1941d, 1102b13–35.

  64. 64.

    See Aristotle 1941d, 1103b17–21.

  65. 65.

    See Aristotle 1941d, 1103a3–6.

  66. 66.

    See MacIntyre 1981, 191.

  67. 67.

    For a further discussion of this claim, see Annas 2011, 15.

  68. 68.

    In addition to Annas, MacIntyre also discusses the difference between a mere skill and virtue. See MacIntyre 1981, 193.

  69. 69.

    For a summary of Putnam’s argument and a defense of Aristotle against Putnam’s criticisms, see O’Callaghan 1997.

  70. 70.

    See Putnam 1988, 6.

  71. 71.

    Another argument that Aristotle is not a representationalist can be found in Esfeld 2000.

  72. 72.

    See O’Callaghan 1997, 527.

  73. 73.

    See Toulmin 2000, 154.

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    Deborah K. Heikes

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Heikes, D.K. (2016). The Origin of Mind. In: Rationality, Representation, and Race. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59171-5_4

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