Abstract
This chapter outlines the rationale, the data collection process, and the potential fallouts of the FIELD (Framework of Incentives to Empower Local Decision-makers) methodology developed by the Turin School of Local Regulation. After an introduction that builds up the peculiar aspects of local regulation and local regulatory analysis, and confirms the need of multi-disciplinary approach in order to have a deep understanding of local services provision, the methodology is presented in a detailed eight-step process. The structured data collection aims at enriching the data set available to local decision makers with regards to actors, incentives, and information in local systems. We will discuss the critical issues that might be faced in the implementation of FIELD and also some preliminary results stemming out from a number of tests carried out in many urban contexts, belonging to both OECD and non-OECD Countries. We will conclude with a research outlook on the possibility of using FIELD to support the design of institutional mechanisms and innovative incentive schemes.
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Acknowledgements
The development of the FIELD methodology started within the Turin School of Local Regulation in the framework of the LORENET (Turin School of Local Regulation 2012) project co-funded by the Chamber of commerce of Torino and Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Torino. We are grateful to the individual correspondents who gave their contribution to the testing phase of the methodology, namely: Atanas Georgiev (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski), Tatjana Jovanic (Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade), Arvind Shrivastava (State Government of Karnataka), and Vincent Pal (Humboldt University Berlin).
The authors wish also to thank the local public service working group of the Turin School of Local Regulation for their support, in particular Fulvia Nada, Andrea Sbandati, and Elisa Vanin.
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Becchis, F., Russolillo, D. (2017). Knowing the Field for Infrastructure and Service Regulation at the Local Level: Players, Information, Incentives. In: Asquer, A., Becchis, F., Russolillo, D. (eds) The Political Economy of Local Regulation. Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58828-9_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58828-9_4
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