Abstract
Thomas provides an account of animals as intentional, acting agents by arguing that animals possess beliefs, desires, and preferences and that they are able to act on the basis of reasons, however simple they may be. Focusing on the idea that rationality and intentionality are not just features of humans, the chapter provides an overview of arguments that support the claim that animals are able to direct their own actions in more or less complex ways. Further to this, Thomas concludes by exploring the idea that some animals can also be considered as minimal moral agents.
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Thomas, N. (2016). Animals as Agents. In: Animal Ethics and the Autonomous Animal Self. The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58685-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58685-8_2
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