Conclusions

Abstract

This book has argued that Sandys’ policy preferences, and the decisions that he made in office, were the practical realisation of a personal nuclear belief system formed out of his interpretation of the role he had played in the fight against unmanned German weaponry during the Second World War. This belief system proved highly influential in helping Sandys to navigate the uncertain and ambiguous strategic landscape in which the defence policy-making processes of the 1950s and early 1960s took place. By beginning with his belief system, and taking it seriously in determining his actions, this has challenged previous scholarly interpretations of the British nuclear policy-making process that place an emphasis on external pressures, such as departmental thinking, political expediency, and, most of all, the prioritisation of reductions in expenditure over attempts to formulate and adhere to any coherent strategic concept. In doing so, it suggests that these accounts miss a critical element needed to form a clear understanding of British nuclear policy throughout Sandys’ period of involvement, and the central tenets of the 1957 White Paper in particular.