Abstract
The primary intention of this volume is to explore the extent to which Sandys utilised the perceived lessons of his Second World War experiences in his activities as Minister of Defence, and to ascertain the degree to which these experiences led him to become wedded to the ideas contained in his 1957 White Paper to the extent that he continued to champion them long after their impracticalities had been made apparent. In order to show the consistency in his approach, it is also worthwhile to explain how he had previously attempted to draw upon those lessons in a context that, whilst different in some respects, was still one characterised by the sort of non-routine and ambiguous situations in which the use of personal belief systems in the policy-making process could thrive. This chapter follows how Sandys turned his experiences into policy preferences and considers his work at the Ministry of Supply throughout 1953 and 1954, when he was called upon to make a significant contribution to the defence policy-making process for the first time.
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Betts, L. (2016). The Ministry of Supply and the Radical Review: 1953–1954. In: Duncan Sandys and British Nuclear Policy-Making. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58547-9_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58547-9_3
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Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-58546-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-58547-9
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