Advertisement

DITMD Versus MPF: Conclusion and Implications

  • Jinhua Cheng
Chapter
Part of the Governing China in the 21st Century book series (GC21)

Abstract

This chapter gives a summarized comparison between the two cases of China and the United States. It describes both similarities and differences between the two cases in terms of intergovernmental transformation and market development. The chapter first compares the American and Chinese ways towards a domestic corporate market and then discusses how to understand the two different models of dual intergovernmental transformation for market development (DITMD) and market-preserving federalism (MPF) and the implications of this study.

References

  1. Acemoglu, Daron, & James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, New York: Crown Business, 2012.Google Scholar
  2. Chen, Zhiwu, “Stock Market in China’s Modernization Process: Its Past, Present and Future Prospects,” Yale School of Management Working Papers, 2006.Google Scholar
  3. Cheng, Jinhua, “Institutional Options for the Settlement of Administrative Disputes in China: From the Perspective of Public Demand,” Social Sciences in China, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2010, pp. 5–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Eskridge, Jr., William N., & John Ferejohn, “The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism,” 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1355 (1994).Google Scholar
  5. Forbath, William E., “Politics, State Building, and the Courts,” in Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins eds., The Cambridge History of Law in America, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.Google Scholar
  6. Friedman, Lawrence M., A History of American Law, 2nd edition, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985.Google Scholar
  7. Goodrich, Carter, “Public Spirit and American Improvements,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, XCII, Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800–1890, New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.Google Scholar
  8. Hartz, Louis, “Laissez Faire Thought in Pennsylvania, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776–1860, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948.Google Scholar
  9. He, Haibo, “The Dawn of the Due Process Principle in China,” Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2008, pp. 57–118.Google Scholar
  10. Horwitz, Morton J., The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977.Google Scholar
  11. Horwitz, Morton J., The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.Google Scholar
  12. La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert W. Vishny, “Law and Finance,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, “The Quality of Government,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 1999, pp. 222–279.Google Scholar
  13. Montinola, Gabriella, Yingyi Qian, & Barry R. Weingast, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China,” World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 1, 1995, pp. 50–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. North, Douglas C., Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: Norton, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.Google Scholar
  15. North, Douglass C., & Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: the Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 49, No. 4, 1989, pp. 803–832.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Oates, Wallace E., Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, No. 3, (Sep., 1999), pp. 1120–1149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Oi, Jean C., “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China,” World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1992, pp. 99–126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Ong, Lynette H., “Fiscal Federalism and Soft Budget Constraints: The Case of China,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2012, pp. 455–474.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Pei, Minxin, “Citizens vs. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 152, 1997, pp. 832–862.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Pei, Minxin, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.Google Scholar
  21. Rawski, Thomas, & Loren Brandt ed., China’s Great Economic Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.Google Scholar
  22. Riker, William H., Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Boston: Little, Brown, 1964.Google Scholar
  23. Rodden, Jonathan, & Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Does Federalism Preserve Markets?” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 7, Symposium: The Allocation of Government Authority, 1997, pp. 1521–1572.Google Scholar
  24. Scheiber, Harry N., “The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts,” in Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., Law in American History, Boston: Little, Brown, “Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789–1910,” Law & Society Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, Essays in Honor of J. Willard Hurst: Part One, 1975, pp. 57–118.Google Scholar
  25. Schmidhauser, John R., The Supreme Court as Final Arbiter in Federal-State Relations, 1789–1957, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958.Google Scholar
  26. Weingast, Barry R., “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1995, pp. 1–31.Google Scholar
  27. Wibbels, Erik, Federalism and the Market: Intergovernmental Conflict and Economic Reform in the Developing World, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Williamson, Oliver E., “Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 58, No. 1, The Mechanisms of Governance, New York: Oxford University, 1996.Google Scholar
  29. Zhang, Qianfan, & Paul Gewirtz eds., The Legalization of Central-Local Relations (《中央与地方关系法治化》), China, Nanjing: Yilin Publishing House, 2009.Google Scholar
  30. Zheng, Yongnian, De Facto Federalism in China: Reforms and Dynamics of Central-Local Relations, Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2007.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Zheng, Yongnian, “The Movement of ‘Exit’” (“退出”潮), China Entrepreneur (《中国企业家》), Vol. 16, 2010.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jinhua Cheng
    • 1
  1. 1.KoGuan Law SchoolShanghai Jiao Tong UniversityShanghaiChina

Personalised recommendations