• Jinhua Cheng
Part of the Governing China in the 21st Century book series (GC21)


The introductory chapter first defines the major question to be addressed by the book, that is, the so-called fundamental state-market dilemma, and then briefly describes existing solutions and their merits and weaknesses in overcoming the state-market dilemma. After that, the chapter presents the book’s major argument: dual intergovernmental transformation for market development (DITMD). Finally, the chapter discusses the comparability of the two cases of China and United States and describes the organization of the book as well.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jinhua Cheng
    • 1
  1. 1.KoGuan Law SchoolShanghai Jiao Tong UniversityShanghaiChina

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