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Introduction

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The Key to Nuclear Restraint

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Abstract

This chapter explains the purposes, research questions and the theoretical model of the study.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    T. Jonter, ‘The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, 1965–1968: An Analysis of technical Preparations’, Science & Global Security The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, 18 (2), 2010.

  2. 2.

    Svensk atomenergipolitik. Motiv och riktlinjer för statens insatser på atomenergiområdet 1947–1970 (Stockholm: Industridepartementet 1970).

  3. 3.

    M. Fjaestad and T. Jonter, ‘Welfare and Warfare: The Rise and Fall of the “Swedish Line” in Nuclear Engineering’, in Per Lundin, Niklas Stenlås and Johan Gribbe (Eds.), Science for Welfare and Warfare (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2010). On the ratification of the NPT, see also J. Prawitz, From Nuclear Option to Non-Nuclear Promotion: The Sweden Case. Research Report from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Stockholm, 1995), p 19 et seq; see also Dassen, L. van, Sweden and the Making of Nuclear Non-Proliferation: From Indecision to Assertiveness. SKI Report 98:16 (Stockholm, 1998).

  4. 4.

    S. Andersson, Den första grinden: svensk nedrustningspolitik 1961–1963 (The First Gate), (Stockholm: Santérus, 2004), p. 86.

  5. 5.

    J. Bergenäs, and R. Sabatini, R., ‘Issue Brief: The rise of a White Knight State: Sweden’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament History’, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 10 February 2010, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/swedens-nonproliferation-history/, Accessed 28 December 2015; P. Davis, ‘Giving up the Bomb: Motivations and Incentives’, The Nuclear Energy Futures Project, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Waterloo and the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance (Ottawa: Carleton University, 2009), p. 6, http://www.icnnd.org/Documents/Davis_Giving_Up_NW.pdf, Accessed 28 December 2015; T. Jonter, ‘Non-proliferation Paper No. 29’, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium (2013), http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/eu-consortium/publications/non-proliferation-paper-29, available 20140921, Accessed 28 December 2015; J. Prawitz, ‘From Nuclear Option to Non-Nuclear Promotion: The Swedish Case’, Research Report (Stockholm, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1995).

  6. 6.

    P. Ahlmark, Den svenska atomvapendebatten (Stockholm: Aldus & Bonnier 1965); W. Agrell, Alliansfrihet eller atombomber-Kontinuitet eller förändring i svensk försvarsdoktrin 1945–1982 (Stockholm: Liber förlag, 1985); Svenska förintelsevapen: utvecklingen av kemiska och nukleära stridsmedel 1928–1970 (Lund: Historiska media, 2002); A. Nilsson Hoadley, Atomvapnet som partiproblem (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1989); B. von Sydow, Kan vi lita på politikerna? Offentlig och intern politik i socialdemokratins ledning 1955–1960 (Stockholm: Tiden, 1978).

  7. 7.

    See, for example, P. Cole, Atomic Bombast: Nuclear Weapons Decision-making in Sweden 1945–1972, Occasional Paper no. 26, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1996; J. Garris, ‘Sweden and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of California, 1972; ‘Sweden’s Debate on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, Cooperation and Conflict, 8, 1973; M. Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

  8. 8.

    For prior analyses based on primary documentary sources, see the present author’s following publications: T. Jonter, Sverige, USA och kärnenergin. Framväxten av en svensk kärnämneskontroll 1945–1995 (Sweden, the United States and Nuclear Energy. The emergence of Swedish nuclear materials control 1945–1995), SKI Report 99:21 (Stockholm, 1999); Sweden and the Bomb. The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1972, SKI Report 01:33 (Stockholm, 2001); Nuclear Weapons Research in Sweden. Co-operation Between Civilian and Military Research, 1947–1972, SKI Report 02:18 (Stockholm, 2002).

  9. 9.

    K. N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); J. Mearsheimer, B. Franklin and Z. S. Davis (Eds.), The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results (London: Frank Cass, 1993); B. A. Thayer ‘The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, Security Studies 4 (3), 1995; T. V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000); J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001); S. Hecker, ‘Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crisis.’ Daedalus 139 (1), 2010: 44–56.

  10. 10.

    E. Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

  11. 11.

    R. O. Kehoane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984; Gourevitch P., ‘The Governance Problem in Strategic Interaction’, in Strategic Choice and International Relations, David Lake and Robert Powell (Eds.), 115–136 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

  12. 12.

    P. Katzenstein (Ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); W. J. Long and R. Grillot, ‘Ideas, Beliefs and, Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine’, Nonproliferation Review, Spring (2000), 24–40; N. Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); M. R. Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009).

  13. 13.

    T. Ogilvie-White, ‘Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate’, Nonproliferation Review, 4 (1), Fall 1996, 43–60.

  14. 14.

    S. D. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb’, International Security, 21 (3), Winter (1996/97), 54–86.

  15. 15.

    S. Sagan, The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation. Review in advance, March 21, 2011, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, web: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23205/Sagan_Causesof_NuclearWeaponsProliferation.pdf, Accessed 28 December 2015.

  16. 16.

    I. Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb. Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed Books, 1998); ‘The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories’, Osiris, 21 (1), 2006.

  17. 17.

    D. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb. The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939–1956 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 3.

  18. 18.

    Ahlmark, Den svenska atomvapendebatten; Nilsson Hoadley, Atomvapnet som partiproblem; Prawitz, From Nuclear Option to Non-Nuclear Promotion.

  19. 19.

    von Sydow, Kan vi lita på politikerna?

  20. 20.

    Nilsson Hoadley, Atomvapnet som partiproblem.

  21. 21.

    Molin, K., ‘Party Battle and Party Responsibility. A Study of the Social Democratic Defence Debate’, in Klaus Misgeld, Karl Molin and Klas Åmark (Eds.), Social Democratic Society. 16 Researchers on Social Democratic Policy and Society (Stockholm: Tidens förlag, 1989).

  22. 22.

    Agrell, Alliansfrihet eller atombomber-Kontinuitet eller förändring i svensk försvarsdoktrin 1945–1982.

  23. 23.

    M. Hjort, ‘Nationens livsfråga.’ Propaganda och upplysning i försvarets tjänst 1944–1963 (Stockholm: Santérus förlag, 2004).

  24. 24.

    See for example, Paul Cole, ‘Atomic Bombast: Nuclear Weapons Decision-making in Sweden 1945–1972’, occasional paper no. 26, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1996; J. H. Garris, ‘Sweden and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of California, 1972; ‘Sweden’s Debate on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, Cooperation and Conflict 8 (1973); M. Reiss, Without the Bomb, 1988).

  25. 25.

    Cole, Atomic Bombast; M. Nilsson, Tools of Hegemony: Military Technology and Swedish–American Relations 1945–1962 (Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press, 2007); C. Silva, Keep Them Strong, Keep Them Friendly. Swedish–American Relations and the Pax Americana, 1948–1952 (Stockholm: Akademitryk, 1999).

  26. 26.

    There are only two studies which deal with US–Swedish nuclear relations. In his paper, Paul Cole partly analysed the US policy toward the Swedish nuclear weapons plans, see ‘Atomic Bombast: Nuclear Weapons Decision-making in Sweden 1945–1972’, Occasional Paper no. 26, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1996. In his paper, Gunnar Skogmar, the Swedish political scientist investigated the US policy toward the Swedish uranium shortly after World War II, see Skogmar, De nya malmfälten. Det svenska uranet och inledningen till efterkrigstidens neutralitetspoliti (Göteborg: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen 1997).

  27. 27.

    Om kriget kommit: förberedelser för mottagande av militärt bistånd 1949–1969, SOU 1994:11; Om kriget kommit: förberedelser för mottagande av militärt bistånd 1949–1969, SOU 1994:11.

  28. 28.

    Om kriget kommit: förberedelser för mottagande av militärt bistånd 1949–1969, SOU 1994:11.

  29. 29.

    A. E. Levite,’Never Say Never Again: Nuclear reversal Revisited’, International Security, 27 (3), Winter 2002–2003, 61.

  30. 30.

    Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again’, 67.

  31. 31.

    Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again’, 64.

  32. 32.

    T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen´s University Press, 2000). On different perspective on nuclear exit, see B. Pelopidas, ‘Renunciation: Reversal and Rollback’, in J. Pilat and N. Busch (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation and Policy, 337–48 (London, Routledge, 2015).

  33. 33.

    For an extensive analysis of security guarantees and security assurances, see Jeffrey Knopf (Ed.), Security Assurances and Nonproliferation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).

  34. 34.

    N. Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo.

  35. 35.

    Nilsson Hoadley, Atomvapnet som partiproblem.

  36. 36.

    T. Erlander, Dagbok. 1953 (Hedemora, Gidlund, 2005), p. 7.

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  1. Graduate School of International Studies, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

    Thomas Jonter

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Jonter, T. (2016). Introduction. In: The Key to Nuclear Restraint. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58113-6_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58113-6_1

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