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Myth and Instruction: Meno

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Abstract

Tofighian explores Socrates’s references to myth and religious tradition in the Meno and the way myth impacts the dialectical exchange with Meno. By introducing mythic themes, Socrates demonstrates how subsequent arguments draw their validity from the views presented by a sacred narrative. Tofighian analyzes two major issues: (a) how the myth intertwines with the dialogue’s story line or plot and (b) how the myth influences the most important literary and philosophical aspects of the dialogue. He explains how myth provides the reader with a horizon for understanding the dialogue’s structure, the place of the characters in the narrative, and the significance of particular themes and motifs in Plato’s literary construction. Tofighian’s reading of the Meno incorporates theories of myth that acknowledge the significance of the trickster character and presents an original interpretation of Socrates’s slave experiment by using the concept of liminality.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Hynes and Doty (1993) p. 4. Also, see Russell (1991).

  2. 2.

    Scheub (2012) p. 24.

  3. 3.

    Babcock-Abrahams (1975) pp. 163–164. For examples of different approaches, see essays in Hynes and Doty (1993).

  4. 4.

    Hynes and Doty (1993).

  5. 5.

    Babcock-Abrahams (1975) pp. 147–158.

  6. 6.

    Scheub (2012) pp. 10–11.

  7. 7.

    Campbell in Maher and Briggs (1988) p. 39.

  8. 8.

    I examine liminality as it pertains to the Phaedo and Phaedrus in Chapters 5 and 6. Socrates is depicted more as a rebel than a trickster in most of Plato’s dialogues (consider the dual characteristics displayed by Prometheus or Hermes); however, in the Meno, trickster characteristics such as playfulness, jest, and deception are more pronounced.

  9. 9.

    Crombie (1971) pp. 521–522.

  10. 10.

    Sternfeld and Zyskind (1978) pp. 30–34.

  11. 11.

    Bluck (1964) pp. 75–108.

  12. 12.

    Ionescu states that the Meno represents Plato’s first attempt at blending epistemology, ethics, and the Socratic form of argument (elenchus) with a hypothetical method of investigation. She argues that in this text Plato is not concerned simply with the essence of virtue but also aims to justify the search for the essence of virtue ([2007] p. xii). In addition, Ionescu explains how the Meno functions as transition by introducing theories and ideas revisited with more sophistication in later dialogues. (For further comments on the Meno as a transition dialogue, see Scott [2006] pp. 6–7 and Thomas [1980] pp. 10–16.)

  13. 13.

    See Thomas’s concerns regarding the problems associated with basing a theory of truth on coherence and hypothesis (Thomas [1980] pp. 155–156).

  14. 14.

    In the Republic, hypothesis is used as a technical term and the Phaedo provides further elaboration of its use and significance. Crombie (1971) p. 528 also discusses the important place of hypothesis in the Meno and its relation to other dialogues.

  15. 15.

    Meno begins by brashly asking a question and expects a quick, concise, and precise answer, reflecting his previous training under the influence of the sophists. This characteristic is indicative of his attitude in the first half of the dialogue (Eckstein [1968] p. 19 and Klein [1989] pp. 38–39).

  16. 16.

    Sternfeld and Zyskind (1978) p. 20.

  17. 17.

    For a study of some of the elements and possible presuppositions about the opening scene, see Ionescu (2007) pp. 1–10. Scott also makes important observations concerning the opening scene and the character of Meno (2006) pp. 11–13.

  18. 18.

    Thompson explains that hardly any dialogue ‘is so clear-cut and simple in its construction as the Meno’ ([1901] pp. xxvi–xxvii).

  19. 19.

    Tarrant argues that the Meno offers the reader a concise explanation of the key elements of Plato’s philosophy and methodology. In particular, he explains how the text is a convenient introduction to Plato’s ethics and epistemology. ‘The kind of introduction that was then required would include material on Socratic definition, the link between virtue and knowledge, and the rules and importance of co-operative inquiry; the Meno fulfilled these requirements’ (Tarrant [2005] p. 4). I add to Tarrant’s interpretation by demonstrating how forms of narrative like myth provide a philosophically satisfactory and aesthetically rich framework for intellectual investigation.

  20. 20.

    I use the term ‘slave’ rather than the commonly used compound noun ‘slave boy’. Justification for removing ‘boy’ is provided by Benetiz (2016).

  21. 21.

    Tarrant (2005) pp. 22–23.

  22. 22.

    Other scholars share the view that questions pertaining to virtue were essentially a pretext for other concerns: ‘But the drama of the episode consists in the fact that Socrates gives virtue a treatment as laudatory (and logically faulty) as anything Gorgias can produce … The principal point is that to find virtue to be knowledge or wisdom (hence teachable) is the wholly laudatory thing to say, and to sing virtue’s praises is undoubtedly the object in the fine speeches Gorgias prepared Meno to make. To construe the hypothetical deductive section dramatically in the way that we have—as saying what Meno finds most satisfying—is more plausible than to consider it the locus of Socrates’s real opinion about virtue, since he subsequently upsets it’ (Sternfeld and Zyskind [1978] p. 14).

  23. 23.

    Klein (1989) pp. 206–222.

  24. 24.

    Klein (1989) pp. 206–222.

  25. 25.

    Tarrant (2005) p. 18.

  26. 26.

    Day (1988) pp. 16–17. For a discussion of the link between dialectic and myth in philosophical education, see Most (2002).

  27. 27.

    Tarrant (2005) p. 5.

  28. 28.

    Weiss describes how the paradox is an objection to elenchus, thus marking, in dramatic terms, the correct time to step up to a more advanced method ([2001] p. 52).

  29. 29.

    Bluck provides an important study of the place of earlier ideas and beliefs and their influence on Plato’s theory of recollection ([1964] pp. 61–75).

  30. 30.

    Tarrant (2005) p. 6.

  31. 31.

    Ionescu gives three reasons for the use of myth in the Meno: first, Meno’s lack of intelligence and its appeal to the emotions and the imagination; second, cultural familiarity and rhetorical appeal; third, as an introduction or basic facilitator (i.e., a mediator which assists one in moving from a simple story to a sophisticated philosophical theory) ([2007] pp. xviii and 47–49). Compare Ionescu’s view of myth to what I describe in the first chapter as the dichotomy paradigm, or evaluation of myth using an inferior/superior framework to contrast with rational discourse.

  32. 32.

    Later dialogues provide the necessary arguments required for removing the label myth from the theory of recollection (especially the Phaedo) but as it is represented in the Meno it features in a story without convincing rational justification. One must be careful not to import doctrinal peculiarities associated with Plato’s later works and respect the text for its unique dramatic, structural, and philosophical arrangement and message (Tarrant [2005] p. 8). For an overview of the different perspectives of Plato’s initial hypothesis in the Meno, see Ionescu (2007): ‘Appendix II—The Initial Hypothesis in the Meno’.

    For an analysis of the connection between recollection and mythical narratives or themes, see Klein (1989): Chap. V. He also discusses the significant role of the theory in some dialogues and Plato’s reluctance to use it in others.

  33. 33.

    Tarrant argues that it is absurd to suppose Plato introduces the theory primarily to combat Meno’s eristic argument (Tarrant [2005] p. 37). I agree that it is implausible to assume the theory was developed only to respond, ad hoc, to Meno’s paradox. However, the way the theory is presented is peculiar to the dialogue, is characterized by the myth, and is profoundly bound to the scenario in which it takes place. My interpretation sees the myth as sharing philosophical and literary affinities with anamnesis and provides inquirers with a better predisposition for learning. The myth’s literary and stylistic qualities inform the structure of the text reflected in the plot, the characters, and dominant themes and motifs. I elaborate on these issues later in this chapter.

  34. 34.

    Morgan (1992) p. 237; Bluck (1964) pp. 274–283.

  35. 35.

    Klein discusses the unique notion of soul represented in the myth and its special relationship to learning, knowledge, and the world as a whole ([1989] pp. 95–96). Also, see Weiss (2001) p. 67 for comments on the distinction between Plato’s notion of recollection and a similar view implied by Pythagorean thought.

  36. 36.

    For a comparison and contrast of the idea and use of recollection in other dialogues, see Bluck (1964) pp. 47–61.

  37. 37.

    See Scott (2006) pp. 60–62 for a comparison between Meno’s intellectual laziness and his earlier three definitions of virtue.

  38. 38.

    Weiss (2001) p. 64. Also, see p. 66.

  39. 39.

    Weiss (2001) p. 69.

  40. 40.

    See Sternfeld and Zyskind (1978) pp. 13–14. The authors discuss how the hypothesis functions as a point from which to make reasonable inferences but may, in fact, be logically faulty. For a description of various demythologizing interpretations of the myth, see Thomas (1980) pp. 127–146. My interpretation, presented here and elaborated below, allows the myth to remain what it is as a narrative and does not require rationalizing. The potency of the myth, therefore, lies in the literary structural features it introduces and how these function in conjunction with the arguments.

  41. 41.

    One of my intentions for giving primacy to the dramatic details of the myth and the literary dynamics of the dialogue is to offer a compelling interpretation of the Meno that counters notions that myth in Plato is irony.

  42. 42.

    Tarrant (2005) p. 8.

  43. 43.

    Landry (2012).

  44. 44.

    One must be careful not to label recollection a theory in the strict sense; that is, it does not occupy an unambiguous systematic position found in other dialogues and used to address different topics or situations. The description and use of the ‘theory’ in the Meno differ considerably from its appearance in the Phaedo or the Phaedrus, for instance (Tarrant [2005] p. 35).

  45. 45.

    ‘As has been abundantly illustrated in the present century, the evaluation of myth goes together with a specific understanding of religion and, accordingly, with a specific conception of man’ (Eliade, forward in Feldman and Richardson [1972] p. xiv). See Vico’s views on myth and a ‘true human science’ (Vico [1999]).

  46. 46.

    Thomas (1980) p. 123.

  47. 47.

    For an interpretation that reduces the mythic elements to metaphor for the purposes of communication and convincing non-philosophers, see Ionescu (2007) pp. 49–64.

  48. 48.

    Tarrant (2005) p. 55.

  49. 49.

    Scott (2006) p. 82.

  50. 50.

    It is not specified whether an ignorant individual has the same disembodied cognitive state as an enlightened individual. Also, how prenatal states differ from post-death states is not a consideration, and the dialogue does not address transition phases that may occur between the time a soul leaves a body and enters a new one. These ambiguities and Plato’s uninterest in clarifying their details suggest that recollection and immortality are constitutive of the conditions introduced by the myth and serve a particular function within those limits. These metaphysical issues are more important for a dialogue such as the Phaedo but have little relevance, if any, in the Meno.

  51. 51.

    Thomas contrasts the type of instruction Socrates gives Meno (i.e., a shared inquiry leading to personal insight) with the sophistic-style instructions Meno was used to (i.e., listening to a speech about the truth from another) ([1980] p. 123).

  52. 52.

    Tarrant (2005) p. 37.

  53. 53.

    Sharples’s introduction to Plato (1985) p. 7.

  54. 54.

    Scott (2006) pp. 69–70.

  55. 55.

    For symbolic representation of the trickster, see 79e–80d and Socrates’s use of a slave to enlighten Meno. I discuss both of these ‘trickster’ features below.

  56. 56.

    Scott (2006) p. 5. Also, see Day (1988) pp. 14–15. Bluck suggests that Plato intended to present Meno as a ‘type’ of person rather than an actual person ([1964] pp. 125–126).

  57. 57.

    For details, see Thompson (1901) pp. xii–xx.

  58. 58.

    See Scott (2006) pp. 11–13 for an interesting comparison between Meno’s character and the literary elements of the opening scene.

  59. 59.

    In addition to being lazy, Meno has been described as shallow and unsophisticated. Socrates deceives Meno by giving him the impression that the discussion is based on his own lead and interests (Ionescu [2007] pp. xiii–xiv). Socrates debates with the Meno as characterized in the text, and by employing the rejuvenation plot Plato accommodates the two personalities in the way they are introduced in the dialogue and tailors the conversation to suit.

  60. 60.

    In contrast to Klein, Sternfeld and Zyskind argue that Plato is less concerned with who Meno is and more interested in illustrating what happens to him ([1978] p. 7). They compare the plot to Sophocles’s Oedipus Rex because both Oedipus and Meno are transformed by the realization of their true identities (see p. 13 for other parallels). And see pp. 8–18 for a step-by-step analysis of Meno’s transformations in the dialogue which reflects, to some extent, the plot structure I postulate here. Sternfeld and Zyskind also compare briefly the role of Meno and Anytos, who is not willing to journey through the course of development that Meno goes through (pp. 8–9).

  61. 61.

    There are many other important features of Meno’s character that I do not explore here. For instance, Scott discusses the influence of Gorgias on Meno’s personality and his arguments ([2006] pp. 23–25). In addition, Scott alludes to the significant differences between Plato’s Meno and Xenophon’s account of Meno that extends until his punishment and death (pp. 64–65).

  62. 62.

    Thomas (1980) p. 23.

  63. 63.

    Lundquist (1991) p. x.

  64. 64.

    Thompson, following Fritzsche’s suggestions, describes the slave as an abstraction and not a real character—he argues that the slave represents an example of a blank mind ([1901] p. xxiv). I argue that his social status, his relation to Meno, Socrates’s style of communication with him, and the effect of his participation prove he is more than a conceptual tool. Thomas also criticizes the view that the slave is an abstraction ([1980] p. 24).

  65. 65.

    By the end of the dialogue, the slave is not inferior to Meno or Anytus. In fact, Socrates is promoting a kind of epistemological egalitarianism unique to the Meno (Scott [2006] pp. 106–108).

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Tofighian, O. (2016). Myth and Instruction: Meno . In: Myth and Philosophy in Platonic Dialogues. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58044-3_3

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