Abstract
Mainstream analysis of pension privatisation and compulsory fully funded retirement scheme defines these programmes as an extension of classical liberal political philosophy and emphasises consumer sovereignty, intensified competition, and market efficiency. We take issue with this widely shared characterisation of pension reform, highlighting its role in giving preferential treatment to the corporate actors responsible for managing private pensions. Chapter 1 conceptualises the perverse distributive impetus of privatisation, drawing on two traditions. Public choice theory has highlighted the prevalence of political rent-seeking—the pursuit of unearned income streams by lobbying government for market privileges. Simultaneously, the critique of state capitalism emphasises the government role in the protection of corporate interests. Political rent-seeking is illustrated with reference to Chile, the pioneer of compulsory fully funded pensions.
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Hyde, M., Borzutzky, S. (2016). A Global Revolution in Retirement Provision? Mandatory Defined-Contribution Pensions. In: Rent-Seeking in Private Pensions. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58035-1_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58035-1_1
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