Abstract
This chapter formulates conjectures to answer the research questions specified in Chapter 1 and spells out their theoretical underpinning. Each research question, related to the sectoral variation of delegation patterns and their delegation over time, is addressed with a series of conjectures. The conjectures involve an adaptation of the principal-agent framework to complex delegation configurations and include feedback loop mechanisms. The chapter then spells out the theoretical background of the conjectures, which draws into the concept of institutional complementarity (related to the Variety of Capitalism theory) and is rooted into historical and rational-choice institutionalism. It emphasizes the role of functional pressure and theorizes how the functional factor interacts with institutional framework and power-distributional considerations in the processes of institutional design and institutional change. Finally, the chapter ends with a synthetic overview of the elements composing the conjectured delegation patterns and processes of institutional change.
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Mathieu, E. (2016). Explaining Delegation Patterns. In: Regulatory Delegation in the European Union. European Administrative Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57835-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57835-8_2
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